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Existing economic analyses generally frame copyright as presenting a conflict
between promoting efficient levels of access to creative works on the one hand and
providing sufficient incentives to support their creation on the other.  The supposed
irreconcilability of the access-incentives tradeoff has led most scholars to regard
copyright as a necessary evil and to advocate limiting copyright protection to the
lowest level still sufficient to support creation of the work.  In this Article, Professor
Christopher Yoo breaks with the conventional wisdom and proposes a new
approach to copyright law based on the economics of product differentiation.  This
differentiated products approach provides an explanation for market features that
appear to be internal contradictions under the traditional approach.  It also sur-
passes prior work by providing a basis for formalizing the incentives side of the
tradeoff.  In so doing, it underscores the importance of an alternative means for
promoting access that has largely been ignored in the current literature:  facilitating
entry by close substitutes for existing works and allowing the ensuing competition to
increase access by lowering prices.  Focusing on this alternative means for pro-
moting access further demonstrates that the access-incentives tradeoff may not be as
intractable as generally believed, since facilitating entry can promote both consider-
ations simultaneously.  The differentiated products approach also assigns the gov-
ernment responsibilities that are better suited to its institutional capabilities than
does the traditional approach.  Equally importantly, it isolates the impact of three
different dimensions of copyright protection, rather than depicting all aspects of
copyright protection with a single variable in the manner of previous analyses.  The
more nuanced analysis made possible by the differentiated products approach sug-
gests that economic welfare would best be promoted if copyright were strengthened
along two of these dimensions and weakened along the third.
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INTRODUCTION
To date, the commentary on the economics of copyright1 has
largely revolved around the feature generally thought to distinguish
markets for intellectual property from markets for other types of
goods:  nonrivalry in consumption.2  Economists classify goods as
nonrival when consumption by one person does not reduce the supply
available for consumption by others.  In the context of copyright,
nonrivalry is generally taken to imply that once the first copy of a
creative work has been produced, additional copies can be made virtu-
ally costlessly.3
Nonrivalry in consumption gives rise to a well-known economic
conundrum.4  If authors are to break even, the per-copy price they
1 This Article focuses solely on the economics of copyright.  It therefore omits any
discussion of noneconomic approaches to copyright.  For a sampling of the alternatives,
see, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (exploring
theories of copyright based in Lockean natural law); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–50 (1988) (advocating use of personality theory
to shape copyright); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (analyzing copyright in terms of promoting particular vision of
democracy). See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer
ed., 2001) (surveying noneconomic copyright literature).  It should go without saying that
in restricting the scope of my analysis in this manner, I do not mean to suggest that I regard
noneconomic approaches as unimportant.
2 Copyrighted works are also sometimes said to exhibit another feature associated
with the theory of pure public goods:  nonexcludability.  Recent theoretical work on public
good economics and the Coase Theorem suggests that nonexcludability does not necessa-
rily induce market failure to the extent previously believed. See Christopher S. Yoo,
Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1594–96 (2003).
Technological advances have also mitigated this concern by rendering copyrighted works
much more excludable than in the past.
3 For the seminal statement of this principle, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–17 (1962).  For other representative
statements appearing in the literature, see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2065–66 (2000); James
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?  Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intel-
lectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2000); David J. Brennan, Fair Price and
Public Goods:  A Theory of Value Applied to Retransmission, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
347, 349–50 (2002) [hereinafter D. Brennan, Fair Price]; Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright,
Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675, 698 (1993) [hereinafter T.
Brennan, Right to Deny]; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1700 (1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326–27 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994–95
(1997). Cf. William R. Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93 J. POL. ECON. 158, 161
(1985) (incorporating nonrivalry into model of copying).
4 This Article focuses on copyrighted works solely as end products.  Extended analysis
of copyrighted works as inputs for the creation of other works thus exceeds the scope of
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charge for a work must cover both a portion of the fixed costs needed
to produce the work in the first place (often called “first-copy costs”)
as well as the incremental cost of making the particular copy sold
(which economists call “marginal cost”).  Allowing third parties to
copy freely would allow those third parties to underprice original
authors, because the prices charged by those third parties would need
only to cover the costs of producing an additional copy without having
to include any surplus to defray the first-copy costs incurred by the
authors.  This would deprive authors of any reasonable prospect of
recovering their fixed-cost investments and would thus leave rational
authors with no economic incentive to invest in the production of cre-
ative works.
The need to enable authors to recover their first-copy costs is
generally regarded as the primary justification for giving authors
exclusive control over their creations.5  Copyright scholars have con-
sistently raised the concern, however, that the exclusivity granted by
copyright gives rise to the familiar welfare losses associated with
monopoly pricing.6  Other commentators have expressed misgivings
this Article.  I offer my preliminary thoughts infra note 204, in which I suggest that R
including considerations of cumulative innovation does not significantly change the anal-
ysis.  For explorations of the effect of cumulative innovation in the context of copyright,
see Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 332–35; Lemley, supra note 3. R
5 It should be noted that the earliest work on the economics of copyright suggested
that transaction costs and strategic considerations could give authors sufficient lead time
over copiers to recoup their fixed costs notwithstanding the problems associated with the
lack of rivalry. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 293–306 (1970);
Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM.
ECON. REV. 421, 427–29 (1966); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in
Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 171–75 (1934); see also Mark S. Nadel, Why Copyright Law
May Actually Have a Net Negative Effect on New Creations:  The Overlooked Impact of
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).  Those arguments were regarded
as unpersuasive at the time they were offered. See Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic
Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books:  A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18
UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971) (offering critique of Breyer’s arguments); Fisher, supra note 3, R
at 1708 n.231 (calling Tyerman’s refutation of Breyer “convincing”); Edmund W. Kitch,
Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1728 & nn.1–2 (2000) (noting Breyer’s acknowledgment of limitations
of his arguments).  The emergence of digital copying and transmission has made them even
less so today.
6 For representative statements appearing in the economic literature, see, e.g., S.J.
Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 8 RES. L. & ECON.
181, 184 (1986); Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright
Protection:  An Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236, 236–38 (1984).  For representa-
tive statements appearing in the legal literature, see, e.g., Fisher, supra note 3, at 1700–03. R
See also Boyle, supra note 3, at 2012–13, 2028–29, 2032–33, 2037–38 (analyzing whether R
monopoly or perfect competition models should be applied to copyright); Kitch, supra
note 5, at 1729–30, 1732–35 (same). R
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about the distributional implications of increasing authors’ ability to
control the terms of access to their works.7
Together, these premises have led most scholars to view copyright
as mediating between the benefits flowing from the widespread dis-
semination of copyrighted works (often called the “access” side of the
tradeoff) and the need to provide authors with sufficient compensa-
tion to support the creation of their works (typically called the “incen-
tives” side of the tradeoff).8  Some degree of copyright protection may
be necessary to provide sufficient incentives to support production of
creative works, but such protection unavoidably reduces access.  In
the extreme case in which producing an additional copy of a creative
work is essentially costless, allowing authors to charge anything for
their works necessarily excludes some consumers even though the
benefits they would derive from obtaining access to the work would
exceed the costs of allowing them to do so.  Conversely, pricing such
works at efficient levels would lead them to be priced at zero, in which
case they would generate no revenue whatsoever and authors would
be unable to cover their first-copy costs.
The resulting tension between access and incentives has led most
scholars to regard copyright as a necessary evil.9  These scholars con-
clude that copyright protection must exist, but should be calibrated to
7 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 3, at 2024–25; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurispru- R
dence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1127 (1998); Fisher, supra note 3, at R
1701–02; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 319–20 (2002); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483,
497 (1996); Netanel, supra note 1, at 295. R
8 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(describing copyright as requiring “a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand,
and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on
the other hand”).  William Landes and Richard Posner similarly observed in their
landmark article on the economics of copyright:  “Copyright protection . . . trades off the
costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the
work in the first place.  Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the
central problem in copyright law.”  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326.  For other repre- R
sentative statements appearing in the economic literature, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN
G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 259 (1992); Liebowitz,
supra note 6, at 184; Novos & Waldman, supra note 6, at 237. Cf. Johnson, supra note 3, at R
159 (noting similar balancing in patent context).  For representative statements appearing
in the legal commentary, see Boyle, supra note 3, at 2013–14; Breyer, supra note 5, at R
281–82; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801
(2000); Fisher, supra note 3, at 1700–03; Lunney, supra note 7, at 485–86, 492–98. R
9 Thomas Macaulay offered the classic exposition of this principle:
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way
of remunerating them is by a monopoly.  Yet monopoly is an evil.  For the sake
of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day
longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.
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the lowest level that still provides sufficient return to support creation
of a work.10  The argument for restraining copyright is thought to bear
particular weight when a work is unique or has few substitutes,
because it is under those circumstances that market power wielded by
copyright holders and consumers is the greatest.11
This mode of analysis, however, suffers from a well-recognized
theoretical defect.  Although courts and commentators routinely
speak of copyright “monopolies,”12 the exclusivity granted by intellec-
tual property protection creates monopoly power only if substitutes
are unavailable and entry barriers prevent the emergence of any such
THOMAS B. MACAULAY, A Speech:  Delivered in the House of Commons, February 5, 1841,
in SPEECHES ON POLITICS & LITERATURE BY LORD MACAULAY 176, 180 (New York, E.P.
Dutton & Co. n.d.).  The hostility to copyright embodied in Macaulay’s statement con-
tinues to influence modern analyses. See, e.g., James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas:  Enclosure
& the Disappearance of the Public Domain, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 13, 16; T. Brennan,
Right to Deny, supra note 3, at 686–88; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace— R
Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1171 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encour-
agement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1989); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting
Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 248–49
(1998).
10 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133
(1999) (contending that “the incentive to create the work is purchased at the expense of
restricted availability,” which “represents a loss of social welfare” and “is acceptable up to
the point required to induce creation of the work, but not beyond”); William W. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing
that goal of copyright law “is to give creators enough entitlements to induce them to pro-
duce the works from which we all benefit but no more”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and
Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1996) (“Any copyright protection
beyond that necessary to compensate the author for lost opportunities would generate no
additional incentive to create and would discourage production of additional copies even
when the cost of producing those copies was less than the price consumers would be willing
to pay.”); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 527 (1999) (describing “the concept of a restricted copyright—one
that protects a copyrighted work to the extent necessary to induce creation, but no more”).
11 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 1811; Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Dis- R
crimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 82–83 (2001).
12 The Supreme Court has long referred to copyrights as granting a “monopoly.” See,
e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 293 (1907) (“[T]he purpose of copy-
right law is . . . to secure a monopoly . . . .”); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899)
(“[T]he right of an author to a monopoly of his publications is measured and determined
by the copyright act . . . .”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56
(1884) (“The monopoly which is granted to [authors] is called a copyright . . . .”).  The
Court’s antitrust tying jurisprudence has also long assumed that copyrights confer
monopoly power. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977);
United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 48 (1962); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 (1953); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 143–44 (1948).  References to a copyright “monopoly” also appear in the Court’s
most recent copyright decisions. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2003); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).  For exam-
ples of scholarly works treating copyright as conferring a monopoly, see supra note 6. R
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substitutes in the foreseeable future.13  Neither of these restrictive
conditions is likely to be met with respect to copyright.  Although
some works exist for which there are few alternatives, substitutes are
readily available for most works.14  More importantly, the “idea-
expression dichotomy” limits copyright protection to the form of
expression without offering any protection for the underlying ideas
expressed in the work.15  This basic principle effectively guarantees
that any competitor willing to undertake the same fixed-cost invest-
ment as the original author remains free to create alternative works
with the same functional characteristics as any existing work.16  By
preserving the possibility of entry into any market for copyrighted
13 See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 53–54 & n.238 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (arguing that
property and monopoly have different meanings in economic theory and should be distin-
guished); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents:  Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON.
31 (1986) (offering classic statement of this principle in patent law context).  To offer a
common example outside the realm of intellectual property, the exclusive right to sell the
land upon which my house is located does not give me the power to charge supracompeti-
tive prices unless no other land with the same functional attributes is presently available or
expected to be available in the near future.
14 Fisher, supra note 3, at 1702–03; see also Benkler, supra note 3, at 2069 (recognizing R
that particular information goods may or may not have close substitutes).
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (providing that copyright does not protect “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” con-
tained in work).  For leading judicial statements articulating the idea-expression
dichotomy, see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 348–51 (1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556–60 (1985); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103–04 (1879).
16 There are no barriers preventing another author from putting pen to paper and
attempting to create a substitute for any written work.  In other words, although copyright
prohibits others from copying the specific words penned by J.K. Rowling without her per-
mission, it does nothing to prevent any other person from writing stories about a school
where children learn to perform magic.  The inputs needed to create substitutes for more
complex media are generally freely available. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration
and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 230 (2002) (noting
that talent and hardware needed to produce television programming are “readily available
in markets already highly organized to supply these same inputs to other industries” (citing
BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 222 (1992))).  There are,
however, some factor markets in which this is not the case.  For example, cable sports
channels often enjoy local monopolies that are often alleged to inhibit the ability of others
to offer competing services. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of
Licenses from Comcast Corp. and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp.,
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, 23284 ¶ 96 (2002)
(describing allegations that Comcast was using its control of Philadelphia’s professional
sports teams to reduce competition from direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems and rival
cable operator RCN).  The more straightforward way to remedy this problem is to redress
the imperfections in the factor markets directly rather than using copyright law to compen-
sate for them indirectly.
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works, the idea-expression dichotomy dissipates authors’ monopoly
power.17  As a result, it would be a mistake to presume that copyright
by itself is sufficient to confer monopoly power.18
Prior attempts to reflect the likely existence of substitute prod-
ucts have not proven wholly satisfactory.  Some commentators have
acknowledged that not all copyrighted works enjoy monopoly power,
while nonetheless continuing to adhere to the intuitions associated
with monopoly pricing.19  Others have treated the issue as a choice
between the polar outcomes under perfect competition and
monopoly, with the degree of substitutability determining the
endpoint towards which copyright law should steer.20  One commen-
tator has turned to oligopoly models.21  Unfortunately, the variant of
Cournot competition employed in this model does not allow for the
possibility of entry.22  Still others have employed “dominant firm”
To say that copyright does not limit entry by competitive content is not to say that
copyright might not serve to constrain entry of alternative media platforms.  Although
individuals always remain free to generate alternative music, text, or pictures, copyright
has long constrained the emergence of new media, such as cable television, video cassette
recorders (VCRs), DBS systems, music downloads, and streaming media over the Internet,
just to name a few.  For an insightful analysis of these issues, see Randal C. Picker, Copy-
right as Entry Policy:  The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002).
17 See Kitch, supra note 5, at 1730, 1734; Lemley, supra note 3, at 1041; Meurer, supra R
note 11, at 60; Douglas A. Smith, Collective Administration of Copyright:  An Economic R
Analysis, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 137, 139 (1986); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 361 R
(noting that limitations on copyright duration reduce market power).
18 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 79, 84
(arguing that because “one author’s expression will always be substitutable for another’s,”
copyright will generally not create monopoly power); Kitch, supra note 5, at 1730, 1734 R
(arguing that “copyrights do not prevent competitors from creating works with the same
functional characteristics” and that “almost all copyrights” are not monopolies); Smith,
supra note 17, at 139 (“The potential monopoly power for individual holders of copyright R
whose works must compete with each other is in most instances not likely to be substan-
tial.”).  A parallel critique emerged in the antitrust literature on tying. See, e.g., Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) (“A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright . . . suffices to
demonstrate market power.”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property §§ 2.0, 2.2 (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132, at 20,734–35 (“The Agencies will not presume that a patent,
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.”); PHILIP E.
AREEDA ET AL., 2A ANTITRUST LAW § 518, at 136 (2d ed. 2002).
19 See, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword:  The Opposite of Property?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 1, 8 n.23; Cohen, supra note 8, at 1801–05, 1811; Fisher, R
supra note 3, at 1700–03; Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: R
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1386–89 & n.76 (1998); Lemley,
supra note 3, at 1041–42, 1072–83; Meurer, supra note 11, at 82–83, 90–100; Sterk, supra R
note 10, at 1205 & n.45. R
20 See Boyle, supra note 3, at 2025–27; Kitch, supra note 5, at 1734–35. R
21 See RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 39–50, 177–90 (2000)
(offering Cournot model of copyright).
22 See Yoo, supra note 16, at 203 & n.135. R
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market structures, in which a single large producer faces competition
from fringe producers.23  Although more promising in terms of cap-
turing the dynamics of entry, these dominant firm models still regard
an inherent tension between access and incentives.24  In addition, for
reasons that I will explain later, they do not capture the full range of
dynamics associated with entry by substitute works.25
I believe that the economic analysis of copyright would benefit
from employing a different approach to imperfect competition that I
believe better captures the key characteristics of markets for copy-
righted works:  the economic models associated with product differen-
tiation.26  Product differentiation occurs when competing goods act as
imperfect rather than perfect substitutes for one another.  An oft-cited
example is breakfast cereals, which vary widely in flavor, sweetness,
and crunchiness.27  To use an example based in copyright, torts
casebooks vary considerably in terms of length, topics covered, depth
of treatment, and perspective, as well as price.  Although some explo-
ration of product differentiation has appeared in the patent litera-
ture,28 to date copyright scholars have accorded it relatively little
attention.29
23 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 334 & n.17; Christian Koboldt, Intellectual R
Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 19 J. CULTURAL ECON. 131, 138 (1995).
24 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326. R
25 See infra note 85. R
26 For surveys of the economic literature on product differentiation, see generally JOHN
BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIA-
TION (1991); B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989).  Overviews of product differentiation theory also appear in all leading industrial
organization textbooks. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 194–235 (3d ed. 2000); JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367–421 (2000); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 600–10 (3d ed. 1990); JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 277–303 (1988).
27 See, e.g., CHURCH & WARE, supra note 26, at 379. R
28 See, e.g., Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21
RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990); Manfredi La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33
EUR. ECON. REV. 1427 (1989); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Indepen-
dent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Ted
O’Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (1998); Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Pat-
ents, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 860 (1990).
29 The most complete discussion in the published literature of the connection between
product differentiation and copyright is Lunney, supra note 7, at 582–89 (applying monop- R
olistic competition to copyright). See also MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, COPYRIGHT REDUN-
DANCY (George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-03) (Jan. 31, 2003)
(applying spatial competition to copyright), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=374580.
Some articles analyze product differentiation in the limited context of direct copying,
in which the copies are treated as imperfect substitutes for the original. See Stanley M.
Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying
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Shifting to a differentiated products approach provides insights
that until now have largely been overlooked.30  The differentiated
products approach provides a theoretical explanation for features of
markets for copyrighted works that appeared to be internal contradic-
tions under previous theories.  It also suggests that nonrivalry may not
play as central a role in the analysis of copyright as generally believed.
Product differentiation theory indicates that the fundamental tension
between access and incentives traditionally attributed to nonrivalry
would still exist even if consumption of copyrighted works were com-
pletely rival.
In addition, the differentiated products approach corrects one of
the central normative shortcomings of the traditional perspective on
the economics of copyright by providing a basis for formalizing the
incentive side of the access-incentives tradeoff.
Even more importantly, it opens up the policy space by under-
scoring the existence of an alternative avenue for promoting the
access side of the tradeoff that has largely been obscured by the
assumptions underlying the traditional approach to copyright.  In
short, access to creative works can be increased by facilitating entry by
new works and allowing the ensuing competition to narrow the spread
between price and marginal cost, rather than by using regulation to
reduce the price of access to extant works.
At the same time, the possibility of entry serves to ensure that
authors obtain enough—but only enough—revenue to support crea-
tion of their works.  The presence of any supracompetitive profits will
attract entry by competitors until all such profits have been dissipated.
At that point, the revenue captured by each entrant should be just
Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255 (1989); Johnson, supra note 3, at 161–63, 170–71; Koboldt, R
supra note 23, at 138; Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 184.  Another working paper uses monop- R
olistic competition to evaluate competition between originals and derivative works. See
Shubha Ghosh, Rights of First Entry in “Derivative Markets”:  Exploring Market Defini-
tion in Copyright (June 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, presented at Second Annual
Congress of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues), available at http://
www.serci.org/2003/ghosh.pdf.  These articles make no attempt to model competition
arising from substitute works.  The only other references have simply noted in passing the
possibility of analyzing copyright as competition among differentiated products without
engaging in any significant exploration of its implications. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J.
Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 3, 5 n.2; Timothy J. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Inc.:
Copyrightability and Fair Use, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 368, 375–76 & n.19
(1985–86); Fisher, supra note 3, at 1702–03; Johnson, supra note 3, at 159; Landes & R
Posner, supra note 3, at 327–28 & n.4; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and R
the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1859 (2000); Meurer, supra note
11, at 60–61, 97. R
30 This Article draws on and extends my prior work applying the economics of product
differentiation to the regulation of television programming. See Yoo, supra note 2. R
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sufficient to offset the author’s cost of production.  By bringing reve-
nues in line with the cost of production, entry largely alleviates con-
cerns about overstimulation of creative activity or sustained
supracompetitive profits generally raised in the patent literature.31
Over the long run, any short-run profits will accrue back to consumers
in the form of increased product variety, which in turn increases wel-
fare by allowing individuals to consume works that better accord with
their ideal preferences.32
The differentiated products approach further suggests that the
tension between access and incentives, commonly regarded as the cen-
tral problem of copyright policy, may not be as intractable as generally
believed.  Because facilitating entry by substitute works typically
involves strengthening certain aspects of copyright protection, pro-
moting access in this manner can have the added benefit of simultane-
ously promoting the incentive side of the tradeoff as well.  In this
manner, the differentiated products approach also contradicts the con-
ventional wisdom by demonstrating how strengthening certain aspects
of copyright protection can actually cause economic welfare to
increase.33
Finally, the existing scholarship on copyright makes almost no
attempt to draw any distinctions among the various dimensions along
which copyright protection can be increased or decreased.  Instead,
previous analyses have represented the overall strength of copyright
protection with a single variable.34  The importance of differentiating
among the various aspects of intellectual property protection has
received some attention in the patent literature analyzing the distinc-
tion between length and breadth.35  My analysis modifies these two
31 See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305, 316, 321 (1992); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 278–79 (1977).
32 The zero-profit result is subject to several important qualifications, which are dis-
cussed infra at notes 91, 102, 206–09 and accompanying text. R
33 This conclusion is subject to an important qualification:  The economic literature
indicates that when fixed costs are large as compared to marginal costs, it is possible that
strong property rights may induce levels of entry that are inefficiently excessive. See infra
note 160 and accompanying text. R
34 See, e.g., Koboldt, supra note 23, at 137; Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 333–34; R
Novos & Waldman, supra note 6, at 239. R
35 See Vincenzo Denicolò, Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length, 44 J.
INDUS. ECON. 249, 252 (1996); Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23
RAND J. ECON. 52, 60 (1992); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and
Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106 (1990); Klemperer, supra note 28, at 113; Maurer & R
Scotchmer, supra note 28, at 542–43; D.G. McFetridge & M. Rafiquzzaman, The Scope and R
Duration of the Patent Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 91,
92–93 (1986); O’Donoghue et al., supra note 28, at 2–5; Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents R
with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470, 470–71 (1982).
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categories to provide a better fit with markets for copyrighted
works.36  It also adds an additional consideration that the current liter-
ature does not take into account:  the extent to which authors are able
to appropriate the surplus created by their works.37
Interestingly, the differentiated products approach indicates that
the relationship between these three different facets of copyright pro-
tection is more complex than generally recognized.  In contrast to cur-
rent analyses, which presume that strengthening any aspect of
copyright protection will have the same effect on economic welfare,
the differentiated products approach suggests that entry would best be
promoted by strengthening copyright protection along certain dimen-
sions while weakening it along others.
The ability to distinguish among different aspects of copyright
protection prevents the differentiated products approach from col-
lapsing into a simple defense of stronger property rights.38  On the
contrary, the differentiated products approach provides a basis for
determining when copyright protection is too strong.  At the same
time, it somewhat paradoxically contradicts the conventional wisdom
by suggesting that the case for expanding copyright protection is at its
strongest when markets are the most concentrated.
Together these insights suggest that the study of the economics of
copyright would benefit from shifting towards a differentiated prod-
ucts approach.  By providing a more complete picture of the dynamics
of free entry, my proposal offers a basis for moving beyond the rela-
tively static, monopoly-oriented vision implicit in the traditional
approach.  In so doing, it compensates for the blind spot that has led
most scholarship on the economics of copyright to regard weakening
copyright protection as the only available means for promoting the
36 For example, the first consideration raised by the patent literature—length—frames
the issue solely in terms of the duration of the patent term. See, e.g., Denicolò, supra note
35, at 249–51.  My analysis infra Part IV recognizes that duration represents only one way R
to expand the number of surplus-generating activities encompassed by the right.  Those
authors that have considered aspects of length other than duration have done so under the
rubric of breadth. See Denicolò, supra note 35, at 252 (citing C. Matutes et al., Optimal R
Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations, 27 RAND J. ECON. 60 (1996)) (considering
number of applications of innovation which are reserved for patentee as element of
breadth).  This Article acknowledges that policymakers can increase the number of sur-
plus-generating activities that fall within the right in other ways as well. See infra Part
V.A.1.
37 The only analysis of which I am aware that even touches upon this subject is the
work of Terry Fisher, who argues that increases in appropriability made possible by facili-
tating price discrimination might justify weakening other aspects of copyright protection.
See Fisher, supra note 10, at 1250–52.  Fisher’s analysis deviates from the one I advance in R
that he seeks to promote social values that are not primarily economic in character.
38 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV.
(papers and procs.), May 1967, at 347, 354–59.
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access side of the tradeoff.  Instead, it emphasizes how the same goal
can be achieved by stimulating entry and allowing the decrease in
price resulting from the increase in competition to facilitate more
widescale dissemination of the work.
In presenting this argument, I acknowledge that markets for dif-
ferentiated products always involve some degree of efficiency loss.  As
a result, the differentiated products approach does not offer a first-
best solution, and the choice of regulatory regime ultimately turns on
a comparison of second-best outcomes.39
Several considerations suggest, however, that the market equilib-
rium under the differentiated products approach will likely prove
more efficient than the outcome under the traditional approach.  As I
will subsequently discuss in some detail, the efficiency losses associ-
ated with the differentiated products approach are not likely to be
significant so long as the fixed costs of entry are small when compared
to the size of the market segment in which a particular work
competes.
In addition, the differentiated products approach assigns the gov-
ernment responsibilities that are better suited to its institutional capa-
bilities than does the traditional approach.  Specifically, the traditional
approach requires the government to calibrate the level of copyright
protection so that authors earn the minimum return necessary to sup-
port creation of their works.  The informational demands needed to
implement such a system border on the prohibitive, and the academic
commentary has grown increasingly critical of whether the govern-
ment is capable of striking anything approaching the proper balance.40
The differentiated products approach, in contrast, makes far more
modest demands of the government.  It requires only that the govern-
39 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:  Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1–4 (1969) (criticizing “nirvana approach,” which compares real alternatives with
ideal norm, as opposed to “comparative institution approach,” which assesses best of real
alternatives).
40 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 103, 107–13 (1999); Fisher, supra note 10, at 1249; Robert P. Merges, Contracting into R
Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1293, 1308–16 (1996); Merges, supra note 29, at 1867–73; Steven Shavell & Tanguy R
Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 541–44
(2001).  In particular, copyright legislation has been singled out for being overly responsive
to industry concerns. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 3, at 2035 (“[I]t would be hard to find a R
more perfect example of rent-seeking than intellectual property legislation.”); Jessica D.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–79
(1987) (describing legislative process leading up to enactment of 1976 Copyright Act); cf.
Merges, supra note 29, at 1875 (noting “broad consensus that industry groups have unusu- R
ally broad input into the drafting of . . . legislation” relating to intellectual property rights).
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ment facilitate entry, depending instead upon market forces to bring
revenues into balance with fixed costs.
What follows is a discursive and graphical presentation designed
to capture the basic intuitions underlying the differentiated products
approach, with a more formal specification of the theory postponed
until later work.41  Part I offers an overview of the traditional,
monopoly-oriented approach to copyright.  In the process, it identifies
several features of markets for copyrighted works that appear to be
logical inconsistencies under the traditional approach and highlights
the traditional approach’s normative deficiencies.
Part II introduces the economics of product differentiation.
Although these models are well known to most economists, they are
less familiar to many legal academics.  So, at the risk of belaboring
points that are already familiar to some readers, I lay out the funda-
mentals of the two principal approaches to modeling product differen-
tiation at some length.  Section A describes the approach based on the
theory of monopolistic competition first elucidated by Edward
Chamberlin.42  Section B discusses the spatial competition models pio-
neered by Harold Hotelling.43  In both cases, I emphasize what has
become known as the “symmetric preferences branch” of each
approach, which presumes that all available products are in equal
competition with one another.44
Part III offers an analysis of the differentiated products
approach’s positive implications, concluding that it provides a basis
for resolving the seeming contradictions identified in Part I.
Part IV, which is the heart of the analysis, explores the differenti-
ated products approach’s normative implications.  Most significantly,
it breaks with the traditional approach by demonstrating how entry
can promote both the access and incentive sides of the tradeoff simul-
taneously.  It also suggests that strengthening copyright protection will
not have the distributional impacts that many scholars suggest.
41 I also hope to apply a similar analysis to patent law.  Patent law differs from copy-
right in that it does give patentees proprietary rights in particular ideas.  In addition, the
doctrine of equivalents gives patentees control over a penumbra of functionally similar
technologies.  As a result, in contrast with copyright, the issuance of a patent does place
limits on others’ ability to create products with the same functional characteristics as
existing products.  Consequently, the free entry assumption that drives much of the anal-
ysis of this Article may carry less validity with respect to patent law.
42 See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETI-
TION:  A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (8th ed. 1962).
43 See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929).
44 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 5–6, 42; infra notes 78, 80 and accom- R
panying text.
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Part V demonstrates how the differentiated products approach
makes it possible to separate the impact of three different aspects of
copyright protection.  In so doing, it offers a significant advance over
the traditional approach, which, as noted earlier, tends to represent all
aspects of copyright protection with a single variable.45  This analysis
reveals that economic efficiency would best be promoted by strength-
ening copyright protection along certain dimensions while simultane-
ously weakening it along others.
I
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT
This Part describes and critiques the traditional economic
approach that has come to dominate modern copyright theory.  Sec-
tion A describes the basic elements of the traditional analysis.  Section
B reviews its positive shortcomings.  In short, real-world markets for
copyrighted works exhibit a number of descriptive features that classic
monopoly theory cannot explain.  Section C analyzes the traditional
approach from a normative perspective, concluding that it fails to pro-
vide a basis for formally assessing the incentives side of the access-
incentives tradeoff.
A. The Basic Economics of the Traditional Approach
Traditional economic analyses of copyright either explicitly or
implicitly are based on the intuitions underlying the graphical depic-
tion in Figure 1, which has become a staple of copyright scholarship.46
Two key aspects of this graph bear emphasizing.  The first is the rela-
tive positions of the average cost curve (AC) and marginal cost curve
(MC).47  When consumption is rival, the average and marginal cost
curves are normally depicted as “U” shaped.48  This is because pro-
duction of most goods requires the incurrence of both fixed and vari-
able costs.  At relatively low quantities, the impact of amortizing fixed
45 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. R
46 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 8, at 1802 fig.A; Fisher, supra note 10, at 1236 fig.2; R
Fisher, supra note 3, at 1701 n.201 fig.1, 1708 n.232 fig.2; Liebowitz, supra note 6, at 185 R
fig.1; see also Kitch, supra note 5, at 1732 fig.1 (employing similar graphical representa- R
tion); Merges, supra note 29, at 1858 fig. (same); Sterk, supra note 10, at 1206 fig.1 (same). R
Figure 1 differs from similar diagrams appearing in prior scholarship that portray the entire
producer surplus as profit.  Such depictions overstate the degree of profit by ignoring the
role of fixed costs.  Because of fixed costs, only the portion of the producer surplus lying
above the average cost curve properly can be regarded as profit.
47 The ensuing discussion on the shape and relative position of the average and mar-
ginal cost curves for rival and nonrival goods is adapted from Yoo, supra note 2, at R
1596–600.
48 For an example, see infra p. 247 fig.5.
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costs across larger volumes causes average costs to decline.  Variable
costs initially decline as well, as the increase in volume allows the real-
ization of the available economies of scale.  Together these forces
cause both average cost and marginal cost to decline, with the average
cost curve lying above the marginal cost curve.
As production increases, the impact of the amortization of fixed
costs on average cost decays exponentially until it becomes essentially
immaterial, and variable costs become the primary determinant of
average cost.  With respect to variable costs, the increase in volume
eventually exhausts all of the available economies of scale.  At some
point, congestion in production facilities and the increase in demand
for scarce factors of production cause the variable costs needed to
produce additional quantities to rise, at which point the marginal cost
curve begins to curve upwards.  Once the increase in marginal costs
becomes substantial enough, marginal cost will exceed average cost
and the average cost curve will begin to curve upwards as well.
Basic principles of welfare maximization49 require that works be
priced at marginal cost, because it is at that point that the social bene-
fits of producing an incremental unit no longer exceed the social costs.
In addition, authors must be allowed to price their works so as to
cover their average costs if those works are to exist.  When goods are
49 For purposes of this Article, I will follow the standard convention and use total sur-
plus as the relevant measure of welfare.  Although total surplus is not the only available
welfare metric, if utility is linear in the composite commodity, maximization of welfare and
maximization of total surplus are identical. See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 729. R
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rival, there are volumes at which marginal cost lies at or above the
average cost curve.  As a result, prices exist that satisfy both the pre-
conditions for economic efficiency and the profitability constraint
needed for a stable equilibrium to exist.
A different situation obtains when consumption of a good is
nonrival.  Because consumption by one person does not reduce the
supply available for consumption by others, one would not expect
increases in production to cause variable cost to increase.50  As a
result, the average cost curve is constantly declining and lies above the
marginal cost curve across all volumes.  The fact that average cost is
always greater than marginal cost gives rise to the distinctive pricing
problem underlying much of traditional copyright analysis.  When
goods are nonrival, there is no volume at which marginal cost equals
or exceeds average cost.  As a result, no level of production exists that
provides optimal access to the work while simultaneously providing
authors with the expectation of sufficient revenue to induce the
work’s creation.  This suggests that absent some other institutional
solution,51 some degree of deadweight loss is endemic to markets for
copyrighted works.  Note that the nonexistence of any price that
simultaneously promotes efficiency and allows authors to break even
derives from the lack of rivalry rather than from any perceived
monopoly power.  No matter how much competition authors face,
they will find it impossible to set a price that both equals marginal cost
and equals or exceeds average cost.
The second feature that bears emphasis is that the traditional
approach presumes that authors engage in monopoly pricing.  Authors
that face competition cannot raise price without losing all of their
sales, since any attempt to increase price would simply induce all of
their customers to transfer their sales to their competitors.52  A dif-
50 Note that the basic conclusions of this analysis do not depend upon the strong
assumption that marginal costs are zero.  Marginal costs can be positive without changing
the analysis so long as they are nonincreasing. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTEST-
ABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 301–02 (rev. ed. 1988).
51 It has, for example, long been recognized that government subsidies can make up for
the shortfall in production. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure
Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 335–36 (1958).  In the context of copyright, this can
take the form of public libraries. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 1806; Gordon, supra note 19, R
at 1388.  Alternatively, the government could implement a prize system, in which the gov-
ernment, rather than consumers, rewards authors for their creative efforts. See generally
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 127–211 (2003)
(reviewing literature in patent context).  Although these alternative forms theoretically
might solve the pricing problem, I am skeptical as to whether governmental institutions are
well situated to determine the value of copyrighted works. See supra note 40 and accom- R
panying text.
52 For a more detailed description of the economics of perfect competition, see Yoo,
supra note 2, at 1587–94. R
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ferent situation obtains if an author is assumed to be a monopolist.
Monopolists by definition have no competitors and can therefore raise
price without worrying about losing their entire sales to others.
Instead, increasing price would simply reduce the number of con-
sumers who actually purchase the product.  As a result, it is common
to model monopolists as facing a downward-sloping demand curve
(D).
More importantly for our purposes, the assumption that the
author is a monopolist also causes the marginal revenue curve (MR)
for authors to lie somewhere below the demand curve.  The intuition
underlying this result is quite simple.  Authors that already are
charging the maximum possible for a given level of production can
only attract new customers by dropping their price.  If authors could
offer the lower price only to new customers without also having to
offer that price to their existing customers, their marginal revenue
curve would coincide with the demand curve over the relevant range.
However, most authors cannot reduce prices for new customers
without also reducing prices for their existing customers.  Any rev-
enue gained by moving farther down the demand curve must thus at
least partially be offset by the revenue lost by giving the lower price to
existing customers.  The marginal revenue curve must then be repre-
sented by the demand curve minus the revenue lost by offering the
price reduction to the existing customers.53  This causes the marginal
revenue curve to lie below the demand curve.54
Like any producer seeking to maximize its profits, a monopolist
will increase its production until the marginal revenue it obtains from
selling an additional unit no longer exceeds the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the additional unit (represented in Figure 1 as QM, where the
marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal cost curve).  Having
identified the profit-maximizing level of production, the firm will
charge the maximum price that it can receive for that quantity (repre-
sented in Figure 1 by PM, where QM falls along the demand curve).
Monopoly pricing has two well-recognized economic conse-
quences.55  First, because monopoly prices exceed marginal cost, they
inefficiently exclude some consumers who would be willing to
purchase the work at prices between PM and marginal cost.  The
53 This analysis changes somewhat if the firm is able to price discriminate. See infra
notes 56–60 and accompanying text. R
54 In fact, when the demand function for a particular product is linear, the marginal
revenue curve is given by a straight line with twice the slope of the demand curve inter-
secting the vertical axis at the same point as the demand curve. See SCHERER & ROSS,
supra note 26, at 21 n.13 (offering simple proof of this relationship). R
55 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
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reduction in economic welfare caused by this underproduction is
called deadweight loss (DWL) and is represented by the darkly
shaded triangular area in Figure 1.  Second, if producer surplus
exceeds fixed costs, authors can earn supracompetitive profits, repre-
sented by the lightly shaded rectangular area of Figure 1.  Not only do
these profits raise distributional concerns, they also threaten to over-
stimulate creative activity by overcompensating authors for their
efforts.  Some scholars have argued that this tension could be resolved
by making it easier for authors to price discriminate.56  Perfect price
discrimination (i.e., if authors were able to charge each consumer the
maximum amount she would be willing to pay) would eliminate dead-
weight loss while simultaneously optimizing authors’ incentives to
create.57  The problem is that perfect price discrimination is never pos-
sible, and while it is more likely than not that imperfect price discrimi-
nation will cause total output to increase and deadweight loss to fall,58
the opposite may well hold true.59  In addition, the increase in profits
made possible by price discrimination threatens to exacerbate the dis-
tributive and overstimulation problems.60
The traditional approach thus provides ample reason for concern
that markets will not provide efficient levels of access.  Despite the
well-recognized shortcomings of relying on the government to allocate
56 The seminal discussion of price discrimination is JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS
OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188–95 (8th ed. 1948).  For recent overviews in the context of
copyrighted works, see Meurer, supra note 11; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1618–27, 1706–12.  For R
other discussions in the context of nonrival consumption, see James M. Buchanan, Public
Goods in Theory and Practice:  A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Discussion, 10 J.L. &
ECON. 193, 193–96 (1967); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13
J.L. & ECON. 293, 301–04 (1970); Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production
of Collective Goods, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 3–5 (1968).
57 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:  The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 588 & n.142 (1998); Fisher,
supra note 10, at 1237–40; Fisher, supra note 3, at 1709–10; David Friedman, In Defense of R
Private Orderings:  Comments on Julie Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help,” 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151, 1168–71 (1998).  For a related argument in the con-
text of television programming, see Yoo, supra note 2, at 1618–27, 1706–12. R
58 See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 241 (8th ed. 1987); SCHERER &
ROSS, supra note 26, at 495. R
59 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 56, at 190–94; Michael L. Katz, Non-Uniform R
Pricing, Output and Welfare Under Monopoly, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 37, 51 (1983); Richard
Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Dis-
crimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1981); Jun-ji Shih et al., A General Analysis of the
Output Effect Under Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 98 ECON. J. 149, 152–54 (1988).
60 See Boyle, supra note 3, at 2025–26, 2029; Cohen, supra note 8, at 1806. But see R
Fisher, supra note 10, at 1239 (noting that price discrimination provides more consumers R
with access to creative works); id. at 1240 & n.89, 1249–50 (arguing that facilitating price
discrimination would make possible offsetting adjustments in other aspects of copyright
designed to promote distributional equity).
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goods in an efficient manner,61 adherents of the monopoly model rely
upon policymakers to calibrate the level of copyright protection so as
to permit the greatest possible degree of access while still providing
sufficient incentives for the work to be created in the first place.62
B. The Positive Deficiencies of the Traditional Approach
One measure of an economic theory is how well its predictions
match up with real-world features of markets for copyrighted works.  I
have already noted the traditional approach’s inability to account for
the relative ease with which competitors can enter the market with
near substitutes.63  Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the
traditional approach also fails to explain a number of other important
market features.
1. Nonrivalry and Zero Marginal Costs
As noted earlier, traditional economic theories assume that copy-
righted works can be copied costlessly.64  It is this feature that trans-
forms copyright into an intractable tradeoff between access and
incentives.
There is reason to question whether the marginal cost curves will
assume the shape and position posited by the traditional approach for
all copyrighted works.  On the contrary, it is more likely that copy-
righted works will occupy a spectrum.  At one extreme are works that
can be copied an unlimited number of times at virtually no expense.
Indeed, the pervasive shift towards digitization of media is causing the
number of works at this end of the spectrum to increase dramatically.
At the other extreme are three-dimensional analog works, such as
stone sculptures, textured paintings, and other pieces of physical art,
that are rather hard to copy.  Although digital images can inexpen-
sively capture some aspects of such works, copies that capture the full
range of the aesthetic experience remain extremely expensive.65  The
extent to which particular works will exhibit some degree of rivalry in
61 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
62 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. R
63 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. R
64 See supra notes 3, 46–51 and accompanying text. R
65 See Lunney, supra note 7, at 493 n.24; John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the R
School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 150 (1991); cf. Richard A. Epstein, Transaction
Costs and Property Rights:  Or Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?, in CHICAGO
LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 175, 177 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (noting that “cop-
ying” farm produce is impossible).
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consumption depends on the extent to which the copyrighted material
must be combined with physical inputs.66
Transmission costs could also be a source of nonzero marginal
costs.  Transmission costs may be substantial if every copy of the crea-
tive work must be fixed into a physical form.  Conventional wisdom
holds that the cost of transmitting digital content over the Internet is
trivial, but it is possible that distributors of electronic media will incur
more substantial transmission costs.
Consider, for example, the costs associated with transmitting
Internet content to an incremental household via a cable modem
system.  If the network has not yet been extended to that household,
the provider may well have to incur additional costs in order to pro-
vide the service.  Even more to the point, many components of the
system of content servers, backbones, local servers, and neighborhood
nodes necessary to provide Internet service are subject to conges-
tion.67  Although it initially seems possible to add an incremental user
at no additional cost, doing so in fact imposes costs by decreasing the
quality of service provided to other users and by hastening the day at
which additional capital investments will be necessary to expand net-
work capacity.  The lumpiness of these investments thus justifies con-
ceiving of transmission costs as a step function rather than as constant
and flat.  Viewed from a distance, systems that appear to exhibit zero
marginal costs begin to manifest some degree of rivalry.
It is thus not clear that all real-world markets for copyrighted
works will exhibit the declining average cost structure that is central to
the traditional approach.  The implication is either that the tension
between access and incentives identified by monopoly theory does not
always exist, in which case one would expect the scope of copyright
protection doctrine to vary across different types of works, or, as I will
subsequently suggest, that the relationship between average and mar-
ginal cost usually attributed to nonrivalry in consumption may in fact
stem from some other source.68
2. The Absence of Natural Monopoly
One of the standard results in the economic literature is that mar-
kets for nonrival goods will exhibit a strong tendency towards natural
66 See I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different:  Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog
Works and Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211, 233
(2001); Kitch, supra note 5, at 1737 & n.21; Merges, supra note 29, at 1859.  For examples R
of this effect in the context of television programming, see Demsetz, supra note 56, at R
296–303; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1631–32. R
67 See Yoo, supra note 16, at 263. R
68 See infra Part III.A.
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monopoly.69  This is because the presence of zero marginal costs
causes average cost to decline across all volumes.  The inexhaustibility
of the economies of scale gives authors with the largest volumes a
decisive cost advantage that should allow them to drive all of their
competitors out of the market.
This effect can be illustrated by the example of torts casebooks.
Assume that two authors split a market of one thousand students.
Each must charge a price that covers both the marginal cost of pro-
ducing each copy and an allocation of the fixed costs needed to pro-
duce the first copy.  Authors that sell more textbooks can spread their
fixed costs over larger volumes, permitting them to undercut the unit
price charged by other authors.  If the works are completely fungible,
every buyer will base her decision solely on price and choose the
casebook with the larger volume.  In this manner, the cost advantages
allow the author with the higher volume to capture the entire market.
Of course, a casual perusal of available creative works reveals
that most, if not all, face sustainable competition from multiple pro-
ducers.  I do not mean to imply that anyone will find it surprising that
not all copyrighted works devolve into natural monopolies.  My point
is that the inability of the traditional approach to provide an explana-
tion of why this is so signals a basic problem with the theory under-
lying it.  The presence of competition despite the presence of
unexhausted scale economies strongly suggests the presence of
another economic consideration that is not adequately being taken
into account.
69 See Brennan, supra note 29, at 375 (noting that lack of rivalry “implies that for each R
particular piece of intellectual property, one firm could produce and distribute it less
expensively than a number of firms”); see also RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 348–49 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that for pure public goods, “[t]he entire population is in a single provision associa-
tion”); WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 47 (1982) (noting
that increasing returns to scale associated with natural monopoly “are closely related to the
concept of public goods”); STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS, AND
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 27 (1991) (noting that high overhead costs and zero marginal
costs associated with nonrivalry “certainly evokes the standard natural monopoly model”);
Dagobert L. Brito & William H. Oakland, On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable
Public Goods, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1980) (noting that if left to private sector,
scale economies would cause many public goods to be “characterized by monopoly ele-
ments”).  The tendency towards natural monopoly would also give markets a winner-take-
all quality that promotes the type of destructive races to get to the market that have com-
manded so much attention in patent law. See Meurer, supra note 11, at 97. See generally R
Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation:  Research, Development, and Diffusion,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 26, at 849, 853 (reviewing R
literature on patent races).  For the classic statement of how intellectual property can allow
a firm to dominate an entire market, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–87 (2d ed. 1947).
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3. The Relationship Between Market Power, Free Entry, and Profit
As noted earlier, the idea-expression dichotomy ensures that
entry into markets for copyrighted works should generally be quite
easy.70  This suggests that entry by substitutes should force prices
towards marginal cost and dissipate any monopoly power that may
exist.  At the same time, if authors are to produce creative works, they
must possess sufficient market power to charge prices that exceed
marginal cost.
The traditional approach cannot adequately explain how these
conditions of free entry and market power can coexist, since theoreti-
cally the influx of substitutes should dissipate authors’ ability to exert
any power over price.  The absence of widescale monopoly profits
presents a similar puzzle.  Monopoly theory suggests that such profits
should be endemic.  Free entry, on the other hand, suggests that no
profits should exist.
This apparent paradox has confounded economically sophisti-
cated commentators on both sides of the copyright debate.  For
example, in his critique of price discrimination, James Boyle asserts
that the coexistence of free entry and market power represents an
irreconcilable internal contradiction that cannot be resolved in a prin-
cipled manner.71  Edmund Kitch sounds a similar theme when he criti-
cizes Landes and Posner for asserting that copyrighted works confront
downward-sloping demand curves while acknowledging at the same
time that copyrights generally do not confer monopoly power.72
Despite the significant differences in their views about the proper
scope of copyright protection, Boyle and Kitch are united in pointing
out that the simultaneous coexistence of these features represents a
paradox that the traditional approach is unable to resolve.
Again, I do not mean to suggest that anyone would be surprised
that copyrighted works face competition from substitutes, possess a
degree of power over price, and do not typically garner supracompeti-
tive profits.  My point is that the traditional approach’s inability to
provide an explanation for how these features can occur at the same
time suggests the possibility of a fundamental deficiency in the
existing theories.
70 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. R
71 Boyle, supra note 3, at 2028–29, 2032, 2037–38. R
72 Kitch, supra note 5, at 1734–35 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 327 & n.4, R
361).
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C. The Normative Shortcomings of the Traditional Approach
In addition to the positive shortcomings identified above, the
traditional approach to copyright suffers from significant normative
deficiencies.  The economic analysis of the problems of nonrivalry has
long been criticized for focusing solely on the allocation of already-
created works without providing any basis for determining which and
how many works should be created in the first place.73  In other
words, the traditional approach adopts an ex post perspective that
focuses solely on the access to copyrighted works.  In so doing, it fails
to provide any means for assessing the incentives to produce creative
works, which arise on an ex ante basis before authors undertake the
sunk-cost investments needed to create the first copy of the work.74
The inability of the traditional approach to provide a basis for
formalizing the incentives side of the tradeoff renders any balance
struck between access and incentives somewhat arbitrary.  In the
absence of such a basis, scholars have adopted less formal approaches.
For example, some scholars have asserted a preference for the incen-
tives side of the tradeoff on the ground that, when compounded over
time, the long-run benefits associated with creating new works will
exceed any short-run static inefficiency losses.75  Other scholars have
developed rough metrics to indicate whether creation of a particular
work would generate net economic benefits.76  Scholars employing
these metrics acknowledge that they do not measure welfare directly
and thus only can provide a vague sense of how much creative activity
would be optimal.
*  *  *
The traditional approach to copyright therefore suffers from crit-
ical positive and normative inadequacies.  Not only does it fail to pro-
vide a theoretical explanation for a number of real-world features for
markets of copyrighted works; it also fails to provide a basis for evalu-
ating the incentives side of the copyright tradeoff.  I now turn to
product differentiation theory, which can help remedy these descrip-
tive and analytical shortcomings.
73 See, e.g., Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J.L.
& ECON. 71, 73, 79 (1964).
74 For an interesting comparison of the ex post and ex ante perspectives on nonrivalry,
see D. Brennan, Fair Price, supra note 3, at 351–55. R
75 See id. at 355; Janusz Ordover & William Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High-
Technology Industries, 4 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 13, 32 (1988).
76 See Fisher, supra note 3, at 1707–17 (using ratio of producer surplus to deadweight R
loss as rough measure of tradeoff between access and incentives).  Fisher adapted the basic
approach from Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1813, 1829–34 & n.54 (1984) (developing metric for assessing patent duration).
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II
A BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS APPROACH
This Part lays out the basic elements of the differentiated prod-
ucts approach to copyright.  Section A introduces the theory of
monopolistic competition, paying particular attention to the exten-
sions of Chamberlin’s work offered during the 1970s and 1980s by
Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, Oliver Hart, and Michael Spence.77
Section B describes the basic characteristics of spatial competition.78
A. Monopolistic Competition
The theory of monopolistic competition retains most of the
assumptions underlying perfect competition, including free entry and
the presence of a substantial number of sellers.79  This ensures that
every product group is “large” enough to justify ignoring strategic
interactions and assuming instead that each producer will set prices
without anticipating that its competitors will react to its pricing deci-
sions.  The key difference is that monopolistic competition relaxes the
assumption that competing works are homogeneous and serve as per-
fect substitutes for one another.  Homogeneous works compete solely
on the basis of price, and authors cannot charge above the equilibrium
price without losing all of their customers to their competitors.  In
contrast, when works are differentiated, the structure of demand for
any particular work allows authors to raise their prices without losing
all of their sales, because they will be able to retain those customers
who most value the particular version they offer.  Product differentia-
tion thus provides each author with a degree of power over price suffi-
cient to justify modeling each work as facing a downward-sloping
demand curve.
77 See generally Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic
Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin:  A General Model, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 529
(1985) [hereinafter Hart, General Model]; Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in the
Spirit of Chamberlin:  Special Results, 95 ECON. J. 889 (1985) [hereinafter Hart, Special
Results]; Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 407
(1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product Differentiation]; Michael Spence, Product Selection,
Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976) [hereinafter
Spence, Product Selection].
78 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. R
79 For formal statements of the assumptions of monopolistic competition, see BEATH &
KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 45; Hart, General Model, supra note 77, at 529; Nicholas R
Kaldor, Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity, 2 ECONOMICA 33, 34–37 (1935).
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Monopolistic competition theory also assumes that consumer
preferences are symmetric with respect to each work in the group.80
The primary effect of this assumption is to place each work in equal
competition with all other works in the group rather than in localized
competition with a smaller set of near neighbors.81
Because monopolistic competition portrays market interactions
in a classic price-quantity space, it is quite easily integrated into a con-
ventional welfare analysis.82  However, because each author is
assumed to make independent price and quantity decisions, monopo-
listic competition theories model competition at the producer level
rather than at the industry level.  This alters the welfare analysis in
several ways.  When markets are modeled at the industry level, wel-
fare implications can be determined simply by looking at whether
total surplus on the relevant graph increases or decreases.  When the
market is analyzed at the producer level, however, total surplus
depends not only on the amount of surplus generated in any particular
graph, but also on the total number of graphs.  In other words, eco-
nomic welfare depends on the total number of works created as much
as it does on the surplus generated by any particular work.83  It is thus
possible for total welfare to increase even though the total output of a
particular producer falls, because any reduction in the surplus gener-
ated by a particular work may be offset by an increase in the total
number of works produced.  In addition, as I discuss in greater detail
below,84 product differentiation introduces a dimension other than
price into the welfare calculus.  When products are differentiated,
authors can also compete by offering works that are closer to con-
sumers’ ideal preferences.
80 See supra notes 44, 78 and accompanying text.  Stated more formally, this assump- R
tion posits that the cross-price elasticities of demand are equal as between all works. See
Kaldor, supra note 79, at 35 n.2.  I will elaborate further on the symmetry assumption infra R
notes 81, 99–112 and accompanying text.  I discuss the implications of relaxing the sym- R
metry assumption infra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. R
81 Chamberlin’s original formulation also made a number of other symmetry assump-
tions, none of which turn out to be central to the analysis.  For example, Chamberlin pos-
ited that each producer faced identical cost and demand curves.  This allowed him to
employ a single graph portraying the price-quantity response of a representative firm to
model the entire market.  Allowing the cost and demand curves to vary across products
simply causes equilibrium price and quantity to differ with respect to each firm, which is
completely reasonable given the assumption that products are differentiated.  Firm-to-firm
variations in price and quantity do not, however, change any essential aspects of the equi-
librium. See G.C. Archibald, Chamberlin Versus Chicago, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 6–7
(1961); Kaldor, supra note 79, at 43–45. R
82 The primary drawback is that doing so requires indirect modeling of product variety.
83 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 341. R
84 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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Profit-maximizing authors will produce at the level at which their
marginal revenue and marginal cost curves intersect.  Because monop-
olistically competitive authors face downward-sloping demand curves,
in the short run they will set prices in the same manner as a monopo-
list, as depicted in Figure 2 (which essentially is identical to Figure 1).
This results in deadweight loss.  Should price exceed average cost, an
author could also earn short-run supracompetitive profits.











Were entry impossible, the analysis would end here, just as it does
under a monopoly analysis.  The existence of barriers to entry would
make this a stable equilibrium.  Monopolistic competition, however,
assumes that entry is always possible.  When entry is free, the pres-
ence of supracompetitive profits attracts other authors selling close
substitutes.  Because all of the works in the market are in equal com-
petition with one another, new entrants take business equally from
each of the incumbents.  This causes the demand curve confronting
each incumbent to shift backwards, as customers substitute purchases
of the new work for those of the incumbents.  In addition, the demand
curve confronting each author should flatten as the increase in the
number of imperfect substitutes available causes demand to become
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more elastic.85  The resulting long-run equilibrium is depicted in
Figure 3.86













Entry continues to divide the available surplus into increasingly
smaller fragments until no profits remain.  Under Chamberlin’s orig-
inal formulation, this occurs when the surplus appropriated by each
author is just enough to cover the fixed costs of entry, a condition
which exists when the demand curve is tangent to the average cost
curve.87  The equilibrium number of works can be determined by
dividing the total surplus associated with the entire market by the
fixed costs needed for entry by an additional work.88  Indeed, as the
85 This flattening of the demand curve distinguishes the differentiated products
approach from dominant firm models. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  Because R
the residual demand in dominant firm models is simply the market demand minus the
quantity supplied by the competitive fringe, entry by competitors simply causes the
demand curve facing the dominant firm to shift backwards without any change in slope.
86 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 136–37; LIPSEY ET AL., supra note R
58, at 264; Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differenti- R
ated Commodities, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 15 (1979).
87 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 42, at 194–95.  The importance of the tangency solu- R
tion and some important qualifications to this conclusion are discussed infra note 139 and R
accompanying text.
88 For example, if a particular market generated $100 in surplus and the fixed costs
needed to enter were $5, entry would divide the surplus into increasingly small parts until it
exactly equaled the fixed costs, at which point there would be twenty works in the market.
The existence of a maximum limit to the number of players caused Oliver Hart to
observe that this type of model is more properly regarded as oligopolistic rather than
monopolistically competitive. See Hart, General Model, supra note 77, at 529; Hart, Spe- R
cial Results, supra note 77, at 889–90.  Hart then proceeded to model monopolistic compe- R
tition in a way that ensured that every incumbent continued to face competition from
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size of the market expands or the size of the fixed costs declines, the
number of works asymptotically approaches infinity and the dead-
weight loss approaches zero.89  Whether an economy is “large” in this
manner does not depend upon the size of the fixed costs relative to
the size of the marginal costs, as suggested by the traditional
approach; it depends on the magnitude of the fixed costs relative to
the overall market.90  There is, however, a well-known exception to
Chamberlin’s zero-profit result.91  The lumpiness of fixed costs may
create a situation in which n works would earn small profits while
n + 1 works would run losses.  This so-called “integer problem” allows
for an equilibrium in which n works each earn sustainable profits.  So
long as the economy is sufficiently “large” (i.e., so long as n is rela-
tively sizeable), such profits will be negligible.
The theory’s impact has been limited somewhat by the fact that
large-group, monopolistically competitive markets are relatively
rare.92  If fixed costs are sufficiently high relative to the size of the
overall market, the number of sellers will be so small that it is no
longer realistic to assume that competitors will not strategically react
to other producers’ pricing decisions.  When that is the case, differen-
potential entrants.  Even if the total number of potential entrants is bounded, equilibrium
prices will tend to approach competitive levels so long as the relevant market is signifi-
cantly larger than the fixed costs of entry. See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. R
89 This is a general result (often called the “Folk Theorem”) that applies across markets
without regard to their cost structure or the nature of competition.  For a classic proof of
this result in the context of Cournot competition with free entry and exit as well as U-
shaped cost curves, see William Novshek, Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry, 47 REV.
ECON. STUD. 473 (1980).
90 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 137, 140; Hart, supra note 86, at 1–2; R
Hart, Special Results, supra note 77, at 899; Larry E. Jones, The Efficiency of Monopolisti- R
cally Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies:  Commodity Differentiation with Gross
Substitutes, 41 J. ECON. THEORY 356, 356–59 (1987); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D.
Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 56–57 (1986).
91 This effect was first identified by Nicholas Kaldor. See Kaldor, supra note 79, at R
42–43.
92 Other criticisms of monopolistic competition are less compelling.  Chicago School
advocates condemned it as an attack on the free market system. See Benjamin Klein,
Market Power in Antitrust:  Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 75
& n.60 (1993).  As this Article demonstrates, monopolistic competition is simply an analyt-
ical tool that may or may not have deregulatory implications.  Other critics have decried
monopolistic competition’s inability to generate simple and testable policy inferences. See,
e.g., Archibald, supra note 81, at 9–15.  As Paul Samuelson has noted, a theory should be R
measured by the insights that it provides, not for its elegance or for the simplicity of the
policy inferences it is able to generate. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competi-
tion Revolution, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY:  STUDIES IN IMPACT 105, 108 &
n.5 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967); see also EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, TOWARDS A
MORE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE 304–05 (1957) (noting that “there might also be sim-
plifying assumptions other than those identified with perfect competition”).
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tiated products markets are better modeled as oligopolies.93  Never-
theless, given the relative ease of generating additional creative works,
and the large market available for creative works, markets for many
types of copyrighted works likely are sufficiently competitive to justify
treating them as monopolistically competitive.94  Indeed, Chamberlin
himself regarded copyright as one of the paradigmatic examples of
product differentiation under his theory.95
B. Spatial Competition
Because monopolistic competition depicts market interactions in
the classic price-quantity space of microeconomics, product differenti-
ation cannot be portrayed directly.  Spatial competition models, in
contrast, follow the opposite tack, making product differentiation the
primary variable without attempting to model variations in price and
quantity directly.  The original formulation assumed that, rather than
compete on price, firms instead vie for business by choosing a location
along a linear geographic space.  One common example imagines hot
dog vendors locating themselves along a beach, while another
imagines stores positioning themselves along the main street of a city
93 See LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 58, at 265; Hart, General Model, supra note 77, at 529; R
Hart, Special Results, supra note 77, at 889–90. R
94 In addition, several regulatory responses are available to markets that are too con-
centrated.  Such responses will tend to mitigate this objection by rendering competition in
those segments more robust. See infra Part V.A.
95 CHAMBERLIN, supra note 42, at 58–59; see also Lunney, supra note 7, at 582–89 R
(applying monopolistic competition theory to copyright).  Although Chamberlin notes that
intellectual property rights might place some restrictions on entry, his primary concern
appears to be with respect to patents and trademarks. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 42, at R
111–12.  In any event, as noted earlier, to the extent that intellectual property rights create
cost asymmetries among works without forestalling entry altogether, they simply alter the
equilibrium price and quantity with respect to a particular work without causing any funda-
mental change in the nature of the equilibrium. See supra note 81. R
Interestingly, Glynn Lunney expands the analysis of substitutability outside the realm
of copyright by arguing that copyright protection, if too strong, can impose opportunity
costs by diverting resources from more economically beneficial activities. See Lunney,
supra note 7, at 488–89.  In so doing, he builds on an insight first offered by Pigou and R
reiterated by Arnold Plant. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 169 n.1 (2d
ed. 1924) (“[I]nventions may actually diminish aggregate economic welfare; for they may
cause labour to be withdrawn from other forms of productive service to make a new
variety of some article to supersede an old one . . . .”); Plant, supra note 5, at 183–84 R
(“Monopoly is, of course, a common enough device for securing in this way the diversion
of scarce resources to particular uses. . . .  What is generally overlooked by the more enthu-
siastic advocates of these schemes is the alternative output which the resources would have
yielded in other employment.”).  This point is well taken so long as the overall market is
already in general equilibrium.  If not, it is quite possible that the distortions caused by
strong copyright protection might well be welfare enhancing.  As a general matter, dis-
cerning which is the case requires the simultaneous solution of an intractably large number
of equations.
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or a railroad.  Because of transportation costs, customers derive
greater utility from purchasing from sellers that are closer to their
locations.  Utility declines as the distance from the store increases
until the entire surplus is completely consumed by transportation
costs, at which point the customer decides not to purchase from that
vendor.  Spatial differentiation thus gives sellers a degree of power
over price, as they can increase price without losing those customers
who are situated closest.96
Economists quickly recognized that the same framework could be
used to model competition among products distributed along a char-
acteristics space rather than a geographic space.  Manufacturers of
apple cider, for example, could face a decision of where to produce
along a spectrum of product characteristics running from sweet to
sour;97 or to use an example involving copyrighted works, popular
music can be conceived as occupying a spectrum from “hard rock” to
“easy listening.”  Under this approach, customers decide whether to
purchase a particular work based on how closely that work matches
their ideal preferences.  The decline in utility represented by transpor-
tation costs in geographic location models is replaced by divergence
from a consumer’s preferred characteristics.
Examples of two such product spaces are depicted in Figure 4.
The horizontal dimension depicts where along the continuum of char-
acteristics a particular work is located.  The vertical dimension in the
graph represents the net surplus available from consumers occupying
any particular location.  Consumers’ ideal preferences are assumed to
be distributed uniformly across the characteristics space.  Each
product is produced by a different firm, and the surplus captured by
each work is depicted by a triangle.  The decline in utility resulting
from the good’s divergence from the consumer’s ideal preferences is
represented by the slope of the triangle’s sides.98  The slope of this line
is determined by the structure of demand, as reflected in the relevant
cross-price elasticities.  If a work serves as a relatively good substitute
for similar works, the slope will be relatively flat.  If not, the slope will
be relatively steep.
Consumers are assumed to purchase whichever work lies closest
to their ideal preferences.  As noted earlier, the symmetric preference
96 Hotelling, supra note 43, at 44–45. R
97 Id. at 54; see also Kaldor, supra note 79, at 37. R
98 Although the assumption that utility falls linearly as distance from a work increases
represents the standard approach in the literature, it is a somewhat strong assumption.
One can obtain radically different results by varying the shape of this function. See, e.g., C.
d’Aspremont et al., On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition,” 47 ECONOMETRICA 1145
(1979) (modeling transportation costs as quadratic function).
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FIGURE 4:  IMPACT OF FIXED COSTS ON THE EQUILIBRIUM UNDER
SPATIAL COMPETITION
hard rock easy listeninghard rock easy listening
utility
A B C FED GA CB
assumption posits that all works within a group are in equal competi-
tion with one another and that entry by a new work takes business
from all incumbents evenly.99  This assumption is represented in spa-
tial models either by positing that all works enter simultaneously or by
assuming that incumbent works respond to product entry by shifting
their position.  The result is an equilibrium in which works are evenly
distributed across the relevant product space.100
99 See supra notes 44, 78 and accompanying text. R
100 See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 141, 143, 145 & n.3 (1979); cf. Samuelson, supra note 92, at 125–26 & n.19 (com- R
paring results under sequential entry and optimal entry in which products are evenly dis-
tributed across characteristics space).  This is tantamount to assuming that works do not
have sunk costs in any particular location.  Interestingly, the assumption that prices are
constant and endogenously determined can give rise to a different equilibrium in which
works, rather than being spread evenly across the characteristics space, divide the market
by entering at the same point. See Hotelling, supra note 43, at 51–54, 57.  The oddities R
resulting from refusing to allow for price competition are well recognized.  For example,
the assumption that firms do not compete on price necessarily implies that effective com-
petition exists only with respect to consumers located equidistantly from two works. See
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 26, at 502–03.  This effect disappears, however, if the model R
is broadened to allow for endogenous pricing in which price competition is possible.  It also
disappears if there are sunk costs in particular locations and works are unable to shift
positions in response to entry. See CHURCH & WARE, supra note 26, at 384–88, 395–404. R
In any event, such minimum-differentiation solutions presumably are preempted in the
context of copyright, in which multiple works are not allowed to occupy the exact same
location.
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As was the case under monopolistic competition,101 entry by
additional works divides the available surplus into increasingly smaller
fragments until the size of those fragments equals the fixed costs of
entry, at which point no work earns supracompetitive profits.102
Again, the equilibrium number of works can be determined by
dividing the total surplus by the fixed costs of entry.103  If the total
surplus is significantly greater than the fixed costs of entry, the
economy will be relatively “large” and the competition among sellers
will be relatively substantial.  As the available surplus increases or the
size of the fixed costs approaches zero, the number of works will
approach infinity and all customers will purchase works exactly
matched to their tastes.104  If the total surplus is small relative to the
fixed costs, the economy will be relatively “small” and works may well
enjoy a degree of local monopoly or oligopoly power.  Although entry
by competitors remains possible under these conditions, the volume
may be too low to support additional sellers, as demonstrated by the
local monopolies enjoyed by gas stations located along thinly popu-
lated stretches of highway.
The two different depictions in Figure 4 illustrate how the relative
size of the total available surplus affects the degree of competition.
The available surplus in the right-hand graph is fifty percent larger
than that in the left-hand graph.  In both graphs, each individual work
captures an identical surplus.  As the graphs illustrate, increasing the
size of the overall market yields a fairly substantial increase in the
degree of competition.  More sophisticated models that allow for price
reactions among competitors further underscore the importance of
the relative size of the economy.105  These models demonstrate that so
long as marginal costs are nonzero, increases in the size of the
101 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
102 This result is subject to the integer problem resulting from fixed cost indivisibilities.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. R
103 As was the case under monopolistic competition, the existence of a maximum limit
to the number of possible players arguably renders the ensuing competition oligopolistic.
See Hart, General Model, supra note 77, at 529; Hart, Special Results, supra note 77, at R
889–90 & n.1.  The robustness of the competition depends upon the number of entrants
that the relevant market is able to support.
104 See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 761; B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, R
Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 282, 290–92
(1985).
105 Most early analyses assumed that competitors would not change their prices in reac-
tion to entry. See, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton, Free Entry in One-Dimensional Models:  Pure
Profits and Multiple Equilibria, 16 J. REGIONAL SCI. 21, 22 (1976); B. Curtis Eaton &
Richard G. Lipsey, Freedom of Entry and the Existence of Pure Profit, 88 ECON. J. 455, 461
(1978); W.J. Lane, Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential Entry,
11 BELL J. ECON. 237, 239 (1980); William Novshek, Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or
Differentiated Product) Models, 22 J. ECON. THEORY 313, 315 (1980).  For a discussion of
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economy cause prices to approach marginal cost and reduce profits by
bringing the revenue captured by each author more into line with
fixed costs.106
Spatial competition models provide for a more intuitive presenta-
tion of the impact of product diversity, although the fact that these
models do not employ the price-quantity space of neoclassical eco-
nomics means that price competition must be modeled separately and
makes it more difficult to integrate spatial models into conventional
analyses of economic welfare.  The foregoing exposition only presents
the basic intuitions underlying spatial competition models and is sub-
ject to a number of qualifications and refinements.  Not all works can
be organized into a simple spectrum of characteristics.  Genres such as
jazz and classical music, for example, may demand a more mul-
tidimensional approach to product differentiation.107
Furthermore, the analysis becomes significantly more compli-
cated when one relaxes the rather restrictive assumptions that typify
the basic model of spatial competition described above.  More refined
models allow for the possibility of sunk costs in location and sequen-
tial entry.108  Other models relax the assumption that prices are fixed
and instead allow prices to be determined endogenously.109  Still other
models allow for the possibility that a single firm might produce mul-
tiple works occupying multiple locations110 or that consumers base
their purchases on multiple dimensions of characteristics.111  Finally,
the complications associated with assuming away price undercutting, see SCHERER & ROSS,
supra note 26, at 502–08; Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 748–49. R
106 See Eaton & Wooders, supra note 104, at 291–95. R
107 As I subsequently discuss, multidimensionality can have profound effects on the wel-
fare characteristics of the differentiated products equilibrium. See infra notes 111, 210–11 R
and accompanying text.
108 See William J. Baumol, Calculation of Optimal Product and Retailer Characteristics:
The Abstract Product Approach, 75 J. POL. ECON. 674, 679 n.4 (1967); Giacomo Bonanno,
Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence, 54 REV. ECON. STUD. 37
(1987); B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Exit Barriers Are Entry Barriers:  The Dura-
bility of Capital as a Barrier to Entry, 11 BELL J. ECON. 721 (1980); D.A. Hay, Sequential
Entry and Entry-Deterring Strategies in Spatial Competition, 28 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
240 (1976); Lane, supra note 105; Damien J. Neven, Endogenous Sequential Entry in a R
Spatial Model, 5 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 419 (1987); Edward C. Prescott & Michael Visscher,
Sequential Location Among Firms with Foresight, 8 BELL J. ECON. 378 (1977).
109 See Eaton & Wooders, supra note 104, at 282–83; Salop, supra note 100, at 143–45. R
110 See James A. Brander & Jonathan Eaton, Product Line Rivalry, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
323 (1984); B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of Market Pre-emption:  The
Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets, 46 ECONOMICA
149 (1979); Kenneth L. Judd, Credible Spatial Preemption, 16 RAND J. ECON. 153 (1985);
Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-To-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9
BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978).
111 See G.C. Archibald & G. Rosenbluth, The “New” Theory of Consumer Demand and
Monopolistic Competition, 89 Q.J. ECON. 569 (1975); Robert C. Feenstra & James A.
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the results change significantly when one allows for the possibility that
consumer preferences are not distributed equally across the character-
istics space.112  The basic model is nonetheless sufficient to capture the
key intuitions about how differentiated products compete and to pro-
vide useful insights into markets for copyrighted works.
III
THE DESCRIPTIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS APPROACH
Compared with the traditional approach, the predictions of the
differentiated products approach to copyright fit better with features
of real-world markets for copyrighted works.  The equilibrium under
monopolistic competition is particularly helpful in providing an expla-
nation for each of the key features identified in Part I.B for which the
traditional approach is unable to account.
A. The Noncentrality of Nonrivalry
One of the most interesting aspects of the differentiated products
approach is that it provides an explanation for the tension between
access and incentives that is completely independent of the assump-
tion that consumption of copyrighted works is nonrival.  According to
the conventional wisdom, the fundamental pricing problem arises
from the assumption that marginal costs are zero and that average
cost therefore exceeds marginal cost across all volumes.113
The differentiated products approach offers a different explana-
tion for the relationship between average cost and marginal cost.
Monopolistically competitive industries reach long-run equilibrium at
a point where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost
curve.114  The fact that demand curves are downward sloping implies
that this equilibrium necessarily occurs where the average cost curve
is downward sloping as well, which in turn implies that the average
cost curve must be above the marginal cost curve.
This suggests that as long as products are differentiated, the con-
flict between access and incentives identified in the current literature
will arise whether consumption is rival or nonrival.  Indeed, as illus-
Levinsohn, Estimating Markups and Market Conduct with Multidimensional Product
Attributes, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 19 (1995).
112 The seminal analysis of the impact of preference asymmetries was offered by Kaldor.
See Kaldor, supra note 79, at 37–40.  For more recent embellishments on this insight, see B. R
Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The Non-Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Löschian
Location Model, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1976); Waterson, supra note 28. R
113 See supra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. R
114 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. R
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trated in Figure 5, the equilibrium positions of the average and mar-
ginal cost curves under monopolistic competition are remarkably
similar to those customarily used to model the economics of copyright.
It is thus no accident that the leading monopolistic competition anal-
yses model the marginal cost curve as flat and lying below the average
cost curve in precisely the same manner as occurs with nonrival
goods.115
FIGURE 5:  LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MONOPOLISTIC











Thus, nonrivalry in consumption may not play as central a role in
the analysis of copyright as generally believed.  This explains why
copyrighted works pose difficult pricing problems even when copying
is expensive or when the copyrighted material must be combined with
rival inputs before the final product can be sold to consumers.  My
point is not that nonrivalry has no effect on the resulting equilibrium.
On the contrary, nonrivalry will determine the shape and position of
the average cost curves, which in turn play a critical role in deter-
mining the magnitude of the deadweight loss.  My point is simply that
the equilibrium will exhibit the same tension between access and
115 See, e.g., BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 42–46, 52–55; Dixit & Stiglitz, R
supra note 77, at 298–99; Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 728–29; Spence, Product Dif- R
ferentiation, supra note 77, at 409 fig.1, 411.  The discussions of monopolistic competition R
in many leading industrial organization textbooks also make the same assumption. See,
e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 26, at 202–07 & figs.7.1–7.2; CHURCH & WARE, R
supra note 26, at 377–78 & figs.11.3–11.4. R
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incentives regardless of whether consumption is rival or nonrival.
Although nonrivalry clearly exacerbates matters, it is not a necessary
condition for that tension to arise.
B. The Absence of Natural Monopoly
Product differentiation also explains why the presence of
unexhausted (and inexhaustible) economies of scale does not cause
markets for copyrighted works to devolve into natural monopolies.
As noted earlier, when competition involves homogeneous products,
constantly declining average costs give rise to a Schumpeterian,
winner-take-all competition in which intellectual property allows one
author to drive its competitors from the market.116
A different situation obtains when products are differentiated.
The fact that works serve as imperfect substitutes for one another
allows producers to coexist even when faced with increasing returns to
scale, as exhibited by the fact that monopolistically competitive mar-
kets reach an equilibrium in which multiple producers operate on the
declining portion of their average cost curves.  Variations in consumer
preferences allow producers to survive by targeting those segments of
the overall customer base that place the highest value on their partic-
ular version of the good.117
Stated in terms of the torts casebook example discussed above,118
product differentiation explains why one casebook does not necessa-
rily monopolize the market even though its larger volume would
almost certainly allow it to underprice the competition.  Authors of
other casebooks remain free to offer differentiated products—by cov-
ering different topics, emphasizing different perspectives, drawing
upon different materials, or posing different questions—and market
them to those who most highly value each particular set of features.119
Product differentiation thus helps prevent the presence of
unexhausted economies of scale from causing markets for copyrighted
116 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. R
117 See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1603, 1657–59.  This is the supply-side analog to the manner R
in which customer heterogeneity can mitigate the demand-side economies of scale resulting
from network economic effects. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to
Networks:  Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 928
(2003); Yoo, supra note 16, at 272, 280–81. R
118 See supra Part I.B.2.
119 This explains how HBO has been able to generate one-half the revenue of CBS
despite having an audience base that is five times smaller, see Yoo, supra note 2, at R
1679–80, and the key role that allowing broadband providers to customize their networks
for different types of applications might play in preventing any one carrier from mono-
polizing broadband services, see Christopher S. Yoo, Fighting Traffic on the Disinformation
Superhighway, THE TENNESSEAN (Nashville), July 8, 2003, at 7.
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products to collapse into natural monopolies.120  The possibility that a
work may compete on factors other than cost makes it possible for a
subsequent entrant to survive despite the presence of cost disadvan-
tages that would be insuperable if the works were homogeneous.121
C. The Relationship Between Market Power, Free Entry, and Profit
The differentiated products approach also provides an explana-
tion for how authors are able to retain sufficient market power to
charge prices that exceed marginal cost despite facing competition
from new entrants.122  This is because under the differentiated prod-
ucts approach, the requisite power over price comes from imperfec-
tions in substitutability (represented in economic terms by negative,
nonunitary cross-price elasticities of demand).  These imperfections in
substitutability cannot be completely dissipated no matter how much
entry occurs.  As a result, every author retains a degree of market
power despite the fact that other authors remain free to create works
with the same functional characteristics.  Were it otherwise, competi-
tion would eliminate authors’ ability to generate sufficient revenues to
cover the fixed costs incurred in producing their works in the first
120 The manner in which product differentiation can prevent markets from devolving
into natural monopolies also provides an explanation of how copyright can avoid the
destructive races to capture the entire market identified by patent scholarship. See supra
note 69. R
121 See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 28, at 540–41 (offering similar observation with R
respect to patents).
122 The most complete exploration of the persistence of market power in the face of free
entry occurs in the literature analyzing price discrimination in competitive markets.  The
seminal contribution on competitive price discrimination is Daniel F. Spulber, Non-
Cooperative Equilibrium with Price Discriminating Firms, 4 ECON. LETTERS 221 (1979).
For subsequent work, see DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 544–48
(1989); Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 579 (2001); Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16
RAND J. ECON. 380 (1985); Kenneth S. Corts, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oli-
gopoly:  All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment, 29 RAND J. ECON. 306 (1998);
Peter C. Coyte & C. Robin Lindsey, Spatial Monopoly and Spatial Monopolistic Competi-
tion with Two-Part Pricing, 55 ECONOMICA 461 (1988); Thomas J. Holmes, The Effects of
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 244 (1989); Michael
L. Katz, Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1453
(1984); Klein, supra note 92, at 74–78 & n.59; Daniel F. Spulber, Competition and Mul- R
tiplant Monopoly with Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 25 INT’L ECON. REV. 425 (1984); Daniel
F. Spulber, Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1981); Lars A. Stole, Non-
linear Pricing and Oligopoly, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 529 (1995).  For recent
surveys, see Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681,
732–43 (2003); Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition (Dec. 22,
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://gsblas.uchicago.edu/papers/hio.html.
For discussions in the antitrust law context, see Symposium, Competitive Price Discrimina-
tion, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (2003).
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place.  Market power is thus more properly regarded as coming from
the product differentiation inherent in the underlying market than
from the exclusivity granted by copyright.
Although free entry may not be sufficient to dissipate market
power, it may be sufficient to dissipate any short-run profits.  As
demonstrated earlier, the existence of short-run profits attracts long-
run entry by close substitutes until no such profits remain.123  Any
supracompetitive returns earned in the short run will ultimately
accrue to the benefit of consumers in the form of increased product
variety.  At the same time, the differentiated products equilibrium
provides a self-regulating mechanism for ensuring that authors to do
not face such excessive entry that they are no longer able to capture
sufficient surplus to cover their first-copy costs.  There is thus no need
to calibrate the scope of copyright protection to protect against the
danger that entry will proceed to the point where the surplus captured
will no longer support creation of the work.124  The free entry made
possible by the idea-expression dichotomy should ensure that copy-
righted works capture sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs and
no more.
The differentiated products approach thus resolves another par-
adox under the traditional approach:  how market power can exist
without allowing most works to earn supracompetitive returns.  This
revelation highlights the importance of analyzing markets in terms
other than just the opposing poles of perfect competition and pure
monopoly.  Simply put, models of imperfect competition sever the
apparent tie between market power and supracompetitive profits that
seems inevitable when viewed solely through the lens of those polar
models.
Finally, the differentiated products approach to copyright largely
renders moot the objection that strengthening copyright protection
and facilitating price discrimination raise distributional concerns.125
Instead, the possibility of free entry breaks the link between market
power, supracompetitive profits, and large deadweight losses posited
by monopoly theory.  Although fixed-cost indivisibilities may create
an “integer problem” that allows some degree of sustainable profits,
123 See supra notes 87, 102 and accompanying text. R
124 See Bell, supra note 57, at 588 n.142 (raising concern that “[s]ubstitutabilty across R
copyrighted works presents would-be monopolists with frustrating flat demand curves,
forcing access prices back down towards marginal costs”); cf. Grady & Alexander, supra
note 31 (arguing that patent doctrine should be tailored to prevent excessive “rent R
dissipation”).
125 See supra notes 7, 60 and accompanying text. R
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any such profits will be insignificant so long as the overall market is
large relative to the fixed costs of entry.126
IV
THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS APPROACH
In addition to offering a better description of many observed fea-
tures of markets for creative works, the differentiated products
approach also provides new insights into the welfare analysis of copy-
right.  Most critically, the differentiated products approach models the
dynamics of entry by substitute works, an aspect that the traditional
approach is poorly situated to take into account.  It demonstrates that
widescale access to copyrighted works may be promoted through
means other than reducing the level of copyright protection.  Specifi-
cally, it reveals that access instead may be promoted by stimulating
entry, which in turn requires the strengthening of copyright
protection.
The differentiated products approach also rectifies the central
analytical deficiency of the traditional approach by providing a basis
for formalizing the incentive side of the access-incentives tradeoff.  In
this respect, the differentiated products approach is reminiscent of the
key insight from classic property theory that efficient levels of invest-
ment depend upon the existence of well-defined property rights.
Together these insights falsify the claim that simultaneous promo-
tion of access and incentives is impossible and that copyright necessa-
rily devolves into a tradeoff between the two.  The supposed tension
between access and incentives turns out to be nothing more than an
artifact of the traditional approach’s reliance on monopoly and oli-
gopoly models that fail to account for entry.  The differentiated prod-
ucts approach reveals that encouraging entry can promote both types
of efficiency simultaneously.
This conclusion is subject to an important qualification discussed
below in Section B.2.  When fixed costs are large relative to marginal
costs, property rights may be so strong as to attract entry even when
such entry is inefficient.  This analysis suggests, contrary to classic
property theory, that it is theoretically possible for intellectual prop-
erty rights to be too strong.
126 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. R
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A. A New Perspective on Access
The shift to a differentiated products approach creates two signif-
icant changes in the analysis of the extent to which markets allow
optimal access.  First, it adds an additional dimension to the welfare
calculus—product variety—thereby going beyond the total surplus
represented in a price-quantity space.  Second, it underscores how
static efficiency can be promoted not by adjusting price directly, but
rather by adjusting it indirectly through the facilitation of entry by
substitutes.  So long as entry is easy, the resulting static efficiency
losses should be relatively small.
1. The Multidimensionality of Welfare Under Product
Differentiation
The fact that markets for differentiated products necessarily
reach long-run equilibrium at prices that exceed marginal cost sug-
gests that some degree of static inefficiency is endemic to markets for
differentiated products.  In addition, the fact that monopolistically
competitive equilibrium does not minimize average cost led
Chamberlin to conclude that these markets necessarily operate with
“excess capacity.”127
Later theorists pointed out that these initial conclusions were too
simplistic and failed to take into account the full implications of
product differentiation.128  When products are homogeneous, authors
can compete only on a single dimension—price—which greatly simpli-
fies the welfare analysis by limiting it to the cumulative spread
between reservation prices and actual prices (i.e., total surplus).  The
welfare calculus changes dramatically when the competing works are
differentiated.  In such markets, works compete not only by offering
cheaper prices, but also by incorporating attributes that come closer to
particular customers’ ideal preferences.  The multidimensionality of
this competition makes simple price-cost comparisons an incomplete
way to determine social welfare.
As a result, product differentiation raises the possibility that any
deadweight losses caused by nonmarginal cost pricing might be offset
127 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 42, at 104–09.  It is this fact that led Chamberlin to R
regard market failure as endemic. Id. at 109 (pointing to systematic excess capacity as
explanation for what was often called “wastes of competition”).
128 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 62–63; Robert L. Bishop, Monopo- R
listic Competition and Welfare Economics, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY, supra
note 92, at 251, 261; Harold Demsetz, The Nature of Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competi- R
tion, 67 J. POL. ECON. 21, 22 (1959); Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 77, at 301–02; Mankiw & R
Whinston, supra note 90, at 49, 54–55; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at R
411.
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in part by welfare gains resulting from product variety.  Although
entry appears to be a waste of resources when products are homoge-
neous,129 when products are differentiated it may actually reflect the
market’s attempt to satisfy differences in consumers’ preferences.130
2. Entry as a Means for Reducing Deadweight Loss
Even more importantly, the differentiated products approach
highlights the existence of a different way to reduce deadweight loss
that the traditional approach largely ignores.  Specifically, it illustrates
how access can be promoted not by lowering the degree of protection
provided by copyright, but rather by facilitating entry by similar
works.  Entry by near substitutes causes the demand curve facing each
work to shift inwards and flatten,131 reducing the spread between
price and marginal cost that is the cause of deadweight loss (as
revealed by a comparison of Figures 2 and 3 above).132  Although
imperfections in substitutability necessarily prevent price from com-
pletely converging to marginal cost, the ready availability of substi-
tutes should cause any remaining deadweight losses to be relatively
small.  The larger the degree of entry, the smaller the deadweight
losses will be.133
In this manner, the differentiated products approach opens up
the policy space by identifying how entry can promote access, an
insight that the traditional approach is ill equipped to consider.  When
nonrival goods are homogeneous, entry is unnecessarily duplicative
129 See infra note 134. R
130 See KELVIN LANCASTER, VARIETY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY 14 (1979) (concluding
that it is better to have increased product variety from producing more goods at outputs
below minimum average cost level than to produce goods at minimum average cost level);
J.N. ROSSE, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, EXCESS CAPACITY, AND INEFFICIENCY
(Stanford Univ. Dept. of Econ. Studies in Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 74, n.d.); Dixit
& Stiglitz, supra note 77, at 301–02; see also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 42, at 94 (calling R
equilibrium under monopolistic competition “a sort of ideal”); BEATH & KATSOULACOS,
supra note 26, at 61 (confirming this conclusion). R
131 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
132 Those unaccustomed to viewing markets through the lens of product differentiation
may find aspects of this new equilibrium somewhat counterintuitive.  For example, the fact
that demand is shifting backwards suggests that the output and total surplus generated by
any particular work will fall.  The key to unlocking this puzzle is to recall that modeling
market interactions at the producer rather than the industry level makes total welfare a
function of the number of works created as well as the surplus generated by any particular
work.  The welfare gains from new entry should more than compensate for the reductions
in surplus generated by any particular product. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. R
133 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 52–54, 140–47; ROBERT S. PINDYCK R
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 424–29 (5th ed. 2001); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 481 (2003).
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and simply wastes resources.134  Moreover, the tendency towards nat-
ural monopoly created by declining cost structures strongly suggests
that no such entry would be viable.  Both of these problems disappear
when viewed through the lens of product differentiation.
How closely prices approach marginal cost is largely determined
by the equilibrium number of firms in the relevant market segment.
This suggests that with respect to market segments that are particu-
larly large (i.e., where the total size of the relevant market is signifi-
cantly greater than the fixed costs of entry), the size of the deadweight
loss is likely to be rather small.  It is true that even if modest, the
presence of fixed costs and finite limitations to the overall market will
render some degree of deadweight loss endemic to markets for differ-
entiated products.135  The differentiated products approach’s inability
to generate a first-best outcome, however, is not by itself sufficient
grounds to justify rejecting it.  The theory of the comparative second-
best also requires comparing its shortcomings to the inefficiencies
posed by other approaches to copyright.  Given the acknowledged
shortcomings of the traditional approach, it is quite likely that the dif-
ferentiated products approach will prove superior with respect to cer-
tain segments of the market.  Indeed, it provides a potential basis for
allowing the degree of copyright protection to vary with respect to
different categories of copyrighted works.
Even with respect to market segments that are too concentrated,
the differentiated products approach identifies a fundamentally dif-
ferent policy tool to improve the level of access to copyrighted works.
Specifically, it suggests that instead of promoting access directly by
lowering the level of copyright protection, access should be promoted
indirectly by stimulating entry and allowing the ensuing competition
to drive price closer towards marginal cost.  Since it is the presence of
short-run profits that induces authors to enter the market with similar
works in the first place, the differentiated products approach suggests
that under some circumstances access may be better fostered by
134 See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,
339–40 (1997); Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in
Radio Broadcasting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397, 397 (1999).  This is analogous to concerns
about “overbuilding” in natural monopoly industries, such as cable television.  For a cri-
tique of such arguments, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest:
An Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1986).
135 Economic welfare will also depend on the time it takes the market to reach long-run
equilibrium.  Since entry will necessarily be non-instantaneous, the long-run benefits of the
differentiated product equilibrium must be offset by the short-run deadweight losses
incurred while waiting for entry to occur.  The magnitude of these losses will be deter-
mined by contextual factors, such as the shape of the demand curve and the magnitude of
the relevant discount rate.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-1\NYU104.txt unknown Seq: 44 26-MAR-04 15:32
April 2004] COPYRIGHT AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 255
increasing certain aspects of copyright protection (although as we
shall see, the analysis suggests that efficiency would best be promoted
by weakening other aspects of copyright protection).  This stands in
stark contrast to the only means for promoting access identified by the
traditional approach:  lowering the level of copyright protection.
Indeed, failure to strengthen copyright only will serve to deter entry
by reducing the number of works that can enter successfully.  Conse-
quently, as I will discuss in greater detail later, it may have the per-
verse effect of cementing an excessively concentrated market
structure in place.136
Entry also mitigates any distributional concerns raised by
increasing the amount of surplus captured by authors.  As noted ear-
lier, product differentiation theory predicts that entry will continue
until all supracompetitive profits are dissipated.137  In other words,
any short-run transfer of surplus from consumers to producers eventu-
ally will accrue to consumers’ benefit over the long run in the form of
entry by works that lie closer to their ideal preferences.  At the same
time, the product differentiation approach addresses the concern,
often raised with respect to patent law, that entry will dissipate surplus
to the point at which authors no longer have sufficient incentive to
invest.138  The equilibrium under the differentiated products approach
effectively should bring the amount of surplus into alignment with the
fixed costs needed to create the first copy of the work.
The conclusion that entry will narrow the spread between
price and marginal cost depends on certain key aspects of the
Chamberlinian equilibrium.  Specifically, it follows from the determi-
nation that monopolistically competitive markets will reach equilib-
rium where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost curve.  If
this is the case, the fact that entry causes the demand curve to flatten
necessarily implies that the market will reach equilibrium at a point
136 See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.  Some might think that the differenti- R
ated products approach’s emphasis on the role of short-run profits in stimulating entry
bears some resemblance to Schumpeterian competition. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 69, R
at 81–86.  A moment’s reflection reveals the inaptness of such a comparison.
Schumpeterian competition involves vertical competition “for” the market, in which the
industry is dominated by a succession of monopolists.  The differentiated products
approach envisions horizontal competition “within” the market, in which multiple pro-
ducers vie for the same customers.  The fact that the differentiated products approach
relies on short-run profits to stimulate entry does not make it Schumpeterian.  In this
respect, the differentiated products approach is no different from the textbook
microeconomic model of perfect competition, which also relies upon short-run supracom-
petitive returns to stimulate the entry needed to bring the market into long-run equilib-
rium. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1591. R
137 See supra notes 87–88, 102 and accompanying text. R
138 See Grady & Alexander, supra note 31. R
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where the average cost curve is flatter, at which point the marginal
cost curve will lie closer to the average cost curve and the spread
between price and marginal cost (and the accompanying deadweight
loss) will be smaller.
It bears noting that whether the market will reach long-run equi-
librium on a flatter portion of the demand curve depends on the
assumption that the relevant demand curve is linear.  If the demand
function is curved, it could be tangent to the average cost curve at any
one of a number of points.  In that case, it is no longer inevitable that
the market will reach equilibrium at a place where the spread between
price and marginal cost is narrower.  In addition, the tangency solu-
tion also presupposes that the author is charging the same price to all
consumers.  Allowing for price discrimination raises the possibility
that a firm might still earn supracompetitive profits even at the point
of tangency, meaning that further entry would occur.  Moreover, as
noted earlier, although perfect price discrimination unambiguously
would enhance welfare, perfect price discrimination is impossible, and
imperfect price discrimination theoretically may cause deadweight
losses to increase.139
I thus do not mean to argue that entry by close substitutes will
necessarily reduce deadweight loss in all cases.  For the purposes of
this Article, it is sufficient to demonstrate how relying on entry may,
under certain circumstances, represent a better second-best solution
than the solution suggested by the traditional approach.  The differen-
tiated products approach also reveals how access can be promoted
indirectly by stimulating entry rather than directly by lowering the
level of copyright protection.  Although that may not be the inevitable
result in all cases, it suggests that under certain circumstances, eco-
nomic welfare might be better promoted by following precisely the
opposite of the policies prescribed by the traditional approach.
B. The Formalization of Efficient Incentives
1. Appropriability as a Determinant of Efficient Incentives
In addition to suggesting a radically different way to promote
access, the differentiated products approach also surpasses the tradi-
tional approach by offering a basis for determining the optimal level
of incentives.  Product differentiation theory suggests that a work
should be produced if and only if the surplus it would create exceeds
the costs needed to produce it.140  When reproduction of additional
139 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. R
140 See Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 77, at 297; Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, R
Product Differentiation, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 12 BELL J. ECON.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-1\NYU104.txt unknown Seq: 46 26-MAR-04 15:32
April 2004] COPYRIGHT AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 257
copies of a work is costless, this condition is met whenever the total
surplus generated by the work exceeds the fixed costs needed to pro-
duce the first copy.
This criterion for determining efficient levels of entry underscores
the key role played by authors’ ability to appropriate surplus.  It sug-
gests that unless authors are able to capture the entire surplus created
by their works, they may find it unprofitable to enter even when doing
so would cause total welfare to increase.141  The larger the slippage in
authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, the fewer welfare-enhancing
works will be created.
Consider the following illustration.  Suppose that a pair of works
would each create $10 million in surplus if produced.  One requires
the incurrence of $4 million in fixed costs, while the other requires $6
million.  Because the surplus created by each work exceeds the fixed
costs needed to create them, the basic welfare metric identified above
indicates that both works should be created.  Suppose further that
authors are only able to capture fifty percent of the available surplus
(as is the case with a monopolist facing a linear demand curve),
thereby generating $5 million in revenue.  If so, only the first work
would be able to cover its costs despite the fact that both works would
be welfare enhancing.  Both works would be created if the copyright
holders were allowed to capture in excess of sixty percent of the sur-
plus, but one can easily imagine similar works costing $7 million and
$8 million that still would not be created.  Indeed, this thought experi-
ment can be generalized into a range of works requiring fixed costs of
anywhere up to $10 million that each would cause total surplus to
increase if produced.  Any slippage in the author’s ability to appro-
priate surplus would cause some of these welfare-enhancing works to
be lost.
At this point, the differentiated products approach would appear
to suggest that economic welfare would best be promoted by maxi-
mizing authors’ ability to appropriate surplus.  Complete appropria-
tion of surplus, however, requires perfect price discrimination, which
is a practical impossibility.142  Were this the only consideration, one
217, 226–27 (1981); Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at 407–08; Spence, R
Product Selection, supra note 77, at 218–20, 224, 230; Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, R
Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q.J. ECON. 103,
110–12 (1977).
141 For a related argument, see R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:  Intellec-
tual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1017–24 (2003)
(arguing that increasing appropriability of information goods leads to overall increase in
production of distinct works).  This conclusion is subject to the qualification regarding
demand diversion discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
142 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. R
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would conclude that markets would exhibit a systematic tendency
towards underproduction of copyrighted works that could not be rec-
tified no matter how much copyright law were structured to enhance
appropriability.  The burden of incomplete appropriability would fall
particularly heavily on works with high fixed costs relative to their
surplus, since authors must be able to appropriate a higher proportion
of the available surplus to create those works.143
This represents a fairly sharp departure from the view of
appropriability taken by the traditional approach.  The most sanguine
perspective regards the transfer of surplus from consumers to pro-
ducers that results from an increase in appropriability as welfare-
neutral.144  More cautious commentators raise concerns that
enhancing appropriability would create excessive incentives to create
and would raise distributional concerns.145
The differentiated products approach casts the appropriability of
surplus in a far different light.  It reveals that the transfer of surplus
from consumers to producers, far from being economically irrelevant,
is instead a necessary condition for ensuring optimal incentives for the
creation of copyrighted works.146  It also suggests that concerns about
overstimulation of creative activity are misplaced, since entry by com-
petitive works will help ensure that no work garners excessive returns.
Increasing appropriability even lacks distributional consequences in
the long run, since free entry will dissipate any profits that initially
accrue to the author and cause them instead to add to consumer wel-
fare in the form of increased product variety.
The differentiated products approach also appears to assign the
government responsibilities for which it is better suited than does the
traditional approach.  The traditional approach demands that the gov-
ernment calibrate the level of copyright protection to the lowest level
possible that still supports the production of creative works.  Under
the best of circumstances, the informational demands needed to
implement such a system threaten to exceed the government’s institu-
143 See BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 59; Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 77, at R
307–08; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at 408, 413; Spence, Product Selec- R
tion, supra note 77, at 224, 234; Spence & Owen, supra note 140, at 112. R
144 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 3, at 1700–02; Lunney, supra note 7, at 497–98.  It should R
be noted that wealth transfers have no effect on welfare only if one adopts the standard
Marshallian device of ignoring income effects.  Even when income effects are present, the
percentage errors involved in taking areas under Marshallian demand curves are likely to
be relatively small. See Spence & Owen, supra note 140, at 104 n.4.  For an interesting R
discussion of how income effects can give wealth transfers greater economic significance,
see HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160–71 (3d ed. 1992).
145 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. R
146 See Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 77, at 297; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 77, R
at 218–20; Spence & Owen, supra note 140, at 121–22. R
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tional capability.147  The differentiated products approach, in contrast,
requires only that the government facilitate entry by enhancing
authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, relying instead on the market
to calibrate prices at the levels that ensure that authors do not earn
supracompetitive profits.
Indeed, the foregoing analysis demonstrates how the traditional
approach may have the perverse effect of making matters worse by
entrenching uncompetitive market structures.148  The existence of
copyright licensing fees that are prohibitively high is a sign that a
market is too concentrated.  Basic competition policy’s typical
response when faced with such problems is to deconcentrate the rele-
vant market by inducing competition from new entrants.149  The tradi-
tional approach to copyright, in contrast, attempts to force authors to
charge lower prices by lowering the level of copyright protection that
their works enjoy.  Reducing the ability of such works to generate rev-
enue, however, has the perverse effect of making it less likely that new
competitors will enter the market.  Lowering the level of copyright
protection thus can become the cause of market failure rather than its
remedy, cementing the existing, overly concentrated market structure
into place.  The better long-run solution might be to increase authors’
ability to appropriate surplus by raising the level of copyright protec-
tion and to depend upon the ensuing competition to drive prices down
towards marginal cost.150
147 Such intervention is also subject to a host of government failures and rent-seeking.
Public choice theory, for example, has underscored how governmental processes tend to
overrepresent certain types of private interests. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
148 For a similar exposition in the context of media regulation, see Yoo, supra note 16, at R
246–47, 269, 293–95.
149 This insight is related to the frequent observation in antitrust law that the true source
of most, if not all, problems of vertical market power is horizontal market power.  See, e.g.,
Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95
(1988).  In other words, the problem stems from the existence of too few copyrighted
works, not from too little access to existing works.  The most effective solution is thus not
to increase access to extant works, but rather to eliminate the core problem by using entry
to reduce the horizontal concentration that represents the true cause of the problem.
150 Interestingly, enhancing producers’ ability to appropriate surplus tends to reduce
consumer surplus.  At the same time, producer surplus is driven down by the assumption
that entry will occur until the surplus captured by authors is exactly offset by the fixed costs
needed to create the first copy of the work.  It would be a mistake, however, to conclude
that this decline in total surplus necessarily implies a decline in economic welfare.  The
reduction in total surplus is counterbalanced by the welfare benefits of enabling individual
consumers to purchase works that provide a better fit with their ideal preferences. See
Christopher S. Yoo, The Role of Politics and Policy in Television Regulation, 53 EMORY
L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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2. Demand Diversion as a Countervailing Consideration
The analysis advanced thus far suggests that economic welfare
would best be promoted by maximizing authors’ ability to appropriate
surplus.  The practical impossibility of perfect price discrimination,
however, would appear to make underproduction an endemic feature
of markets for copyrighted works.  Fortunately from the standpoint of
economic welfare, an additional consideration exists that tends to
offset imperfections in appropriability:  the extent to which a new
entrant’s sales represent “demand diversion” rather than “demand
creation.”151
To understand the distinction between demand creation and
demand diversion, one must recognize that the surplus captured by a
new entrant may come from two different sources.  On the one hand,
some of the sales captured by a new entrant may represent incre-
mental sales to new customers who previously were not purchasing
any competing works (i.e., demand creation).  The surplus generated
by these incremental sales represents an increase in economic welfare
made possible by the creation of the new work.  As a result, to the
extent that sales result solely from demand creation, the profitability
constraint has the natural effect of maximizing welfare, since a com-
parison of the revenue and costs provides an accurate reflection of the
net economic benefits.152
On the other hand, some of the new entrant’s sales may be canni-
balized from works already in the market (i.e., demand diversion).
Because these are sales that would have occurred even without entry
of a new work, most of the surplus attributable to demand diversion
represents a transfer of surplus from one author to another rather
than the creation of incremental surplus.  Demand diversion does pro-
vide some increase in total surplus by enabling some consumers to
purchase works that are closer to their ideal preferences.  Nonethe-
151 The terminology used in this discussion is taken from Borenstein, supra note 122, at R
388–89.  For similar analyses using other terminology, see BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra
note 26, at 57 (“cannibalisation”); Mankiw & Whinston, supra note 90, at 49, 52, 54–55 R
(“business stealing effect”). See also Koenker & Perry, supra note 140, at 226–27 R
(describing effect without employing distinctive moniker); Spence, Product Differentiation,
supra note 77, at 410 (same); Spence, Product Selection, supra note 77, at 230–31 (same). R
For other discussions of this effect appearing in the copyright literature, see Meurer, supra
note 11, at 96–97; ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 29, at 57–76. R
152 Spatial competition models take the existing distribution of potential customers as
fixed.  As a result, demand creation represents movement along the demand curve rather
than an exogenous shift in demand.  It is possible, however, that in addition to causing
movement along the demand curve, copyright law can affect shifts in the demand curve by
facilitating or limiting the emergence of alternative media platforms.  Such a possibility,
while real, exceeds the scope of this Article.  For an insightful discussion, see Picker, supra
note 16. R
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less, the total revenue attributable to demand diversion systematically
tends to overstate its social benefits.
As a result, in determining a new work’s net contribution to total
welfare, the surplus realized by consumers purchasing the new work
must be offset by the surplus that would have been realized even if the
new entrant had not appeared.153  A new entrant, however, will be
concerned solely with profitability, not welfare.  It will enter whenever
gross surplus (as opposed to net surplus) exceeds cost.  Its indifference
to whether its revenue comes from demand creation or demand diver-
sion may lead it to find entry profitable even when the incremental
benefits provided by the new work fall short of the costs of entry.154
Whether the free entry equilibrium results in efficient levels of
entry thus depends upon a balance of two offsetting forces.  On the
one hand, authors’ inability to appropriate all of the surplus created
by their works tends to depress entry below efficient levels.155  On the
other hand, the presence of demand diversion tends to provide excess
incentives to enter.  Whether entry levels will exceed or fall short of
the optimum depends upon which effect dominates.156
The spatial models depicted in Figure 6 provide an intuitive illus-
tration of these effects.  The left-hand graph depicts entry by a new
work that is a relatively poor substitute for other works already
153 As Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley point out, demand diversion is analogous to
forces that tend to induce overfishing of common pools.  That is because each angler will
not take into account that her catch includes fish that would have been caught anyway by
other anglers.  This causes the private marginal costs to understate the social marginal
costs.  Because anglers can be expected to increase their activity until their marginal ben-
efit no longer exceeds their personal marginal costs, one would expect the number of fish
caught to exceed the level that would maximize social welfare. See J. Hirshleifer & John
G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information—An Expository Survey, 17 J.
ECON. LIT. 1375, 1404 (1979).
154 See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.  As discussed therein, policy tools R
exist to mitigate this distortion.
155 Although the analysis advanced in this Article focuses on structural features, such as
appropriability and demand diversion, I recognize that frictional considerations also can
lead to systematic underinvestment.  For an interesting discussion, see HIRSHLEIFER &
RILEY, supra note 8, at 262–63 (describing how informational asymmetries can induce R
what they term “the speculative effect”).
156 Although demand diversion allows a new product to capture the same number of
buyers as would result under complete appropriability, it does not result in the capture of
the same buyers.  Instead, demand diversion substitutes buyers who already were
purchasing other products for new buyers whose purchases represent incremental sales.
Thus, although the total number of sales may reach optimal levels, the total surplus gener-
ated by those sales is likely to fall somewhat short of welfare-maximizing levels because the
buyers who actually purchase the product are not necessarily those who place the highest
value on the good.  Some consumers may purchase goods that provide a better fit with
their ideal preferences, while others may purchase goods in which the fit is worse.  As a
result, the equilibrium amounts to a close approximation of a first-best outcome that falls
somewhat short of maximizing welfare.
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offered.157  The surplus actually captured by the entrant is represented
by the dark gray area of the triangle, with the white triangle at the top
of each representing the amount lost due to incomplete
appropriability.158  Because of the relative lack of substitutability, the
entire surplus captured by the entering work represents demand crea-
tion (i.e., incremental surplus generated by sales to new customers).
The inevitable slippage in the author’s ability to appropriate surplus
causes the revenue generated to understate the work’s social benefits,
which in turn renders the incentives for creation too weak.  Thus, the
inability to capture the entire surplus created by the work inevitably
prevents some works that would make a marginal contribution to wel-
fare from being created.
FIGURE 6:  SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF ENTRY WITH AND
WITHOUT DEMAND DIVERSION
hard rock easy listeninghard rock easy listening
entrant entrantutility
A different situation obtains, however, when demand diversion is
present, as portrayed in the right-hand graph.  In this case, the work
offered by the new entrant is a somewhat better substitute for its near
neighbors, with the adjacent works splitting the areas that overlap.
Part of the surplus captured by the new entrant comes from demand
157 Note that the graphs depict situations in which utility decays linearly with distance
from the consumer’s ideal preference, with the only distinction being the slope of the line.
This is for illustrative purposes only; the particular equilibrium is sensitive to the rate at
which the utility function decays. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. R
158 The figure depicts the area of nonappropriability as residing at the top of the triangle
for illustrative purposes only.  The nonappropriable surplus may occur at any point or may
even be evenly distributed throughout the dark gray region.
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creation (depicted by the darkly shaded, hexagonal area in the middle
of the graph), which again represents the new work’s incremental con-
tribution to total welfare.  Part of the surplus captured by the new
entrant consists of demand diversion (represented by the two small,
triangular, cross-hatched areas).  When demand diversion is present,
the fact that a new entrant is unable to appropriate the entire surplus
created by its work does not necessarily prevent the work from being
created.  Because the author responds to appropriable gross demand,
the surplus attributable to demand diversion can compensate for an
author’s inability to appropriate the entire surplus created by the
work.
In fact, demand diversion creates the possibility of excess entry,
in which authors produce new works even when the costs of doing so
exceed the societal benefits.  As noted earlier, efficient entry requires
that authors produce new works only when the surplus attributable to
demand creation exceeds the fixed costs needed to produce the
work.159  The problem is that a profit-maximizing author will enter
whenever the total surplus captured exceeds the fixed costs of entry
regardless of whether the surplus captured results from demand crea-
tion or demand diversion.  Such an author could finance the fixed
costs with surplus cannibalized from other producers already in the
market rather than incremental surplus generated from new con-
sumers.160  Under these circumstances, the profitability constraint
does not necessarily prevent the waste of resources.  This danger is
greatest when the works in question serve as relatively good substi-
tutes for one another and is least problematic when the degree of sub-
stitutability is the lowest.
The traditional remedies to excess entry stimulated by demand
diversion include direct regulation of entry, price, and output, or ide-
ally a combination of all three.161  When such problems arise in the
context of copyright, policymakers have another regulatory device at
their disposal.  It is possible to redress excessive entry caused by
demand diversion by adjusting the degree of similarity needed to con-
stitute copyright infringement.  By doing so, adjacent works can be
159 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. R
160 Consider, for example, a situation in which a new entrant offers a product that is
identical to that of an incumbent.  The entrant may find it profitable to split the market.
The fact that the products are identical, however, means that there are no compensating
welfare benefits to justify the incurrence of additional fixed costs. See, e.g., Berry &
Waldfogel, supra note 134, at 397; Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and R
the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 200 (1952).
161 For discussions of such regulatory approaches, see CHURCH & WARE, supra note 26, R
at 374; Hart, Special Results, supra note 77, at 900–03; Koenker & Perry, supra note 140, at R
227–28. See also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 26, at 208. R
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forced to occupy positions along the characteristics space more distant
from one another than they otherwise would in equilibrium.  This
would reduce the extent of surplus created by demand diversion,
which in turn would reduce the tendency towards excess entry.  Such a
solution provides a number of institutional and practical benefits as
well.  It allows policymakers to redress any excess entry problems
without having to assume the considerable administrative burdens
associated with directly regulating entry, prices, and output.
V
THE REMEDIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENTIATED
PRODUCTS APPROACH
The differentiated products approach thus has the potential to
revolutionize the study of copyright.  It exposes the traditional
approach’s inability to provide a theoretical explanation for many
salient features of real-world markets for copyrighted works.  In addi-
tion, it suggests that the key economic features of those markets
would still exist even if copyrighted works did not exhibit the lack of
rivalry that is generally regarded as their most distinctive economic
feature.  Most importantly, it breaks with the standard approach by
identifying remedies that can promote access and incentives simulta-
neously.  In so doing, it reveals the supposed tension between those
two considerations to be something of a false conflict.
The differentiated products approach also surpasses the tradi-
tional approach by providing a basis for distinguishing among the
available policy instruments.  As noted earlier, previous models
tended to represent the overall level of copyright protection with a
single variable.162  Although copyright scholars have made some
attempts to analyze the interaction among various aspects of copyright
protection,163 it is the patent literature that has given this issue its ful-
lest articulation.164  In particular, the patent literature focuses on the
tradeoff between a patent’s “length,” typically determined by the
duration of the patent term, and its “breadth,” which is most usefully
described for our purposes as how close a competing product may
162 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. R
163 These analyses tend to emphasize the tradeoff between the remaining length of the
copyright term and other aspects of copyright protection.  Terry Fisher has suggested that
the most efficient copyright legislation would include an infinite term but few other entitle-
ments.  Fisher, supra note 3, at 1719 n.265.  Joseph Liu and Justin Hughes propose broad- R
ening the scope of fair use as the copyright term approaches expiration. See Justin Hughes,
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time:  A
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002).
164 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. R
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come in the characteristics space to a patented product without consti-
tuting infringement.165  There is significant debate in the literature as
to whether patents should be long and narrow166 or short and
broad.167
The differentiated products approach to copyright suggests a sim-
ilar analysis, but with two important modifications.  First, it goes
beyond the patent literature’s emphasis on length by acknowledging
that duration represents only one way to expand the number of sur-
plus-generating activities encompassed by the right.  Second, it shows
how a third consideration—appropriability—also influences economic
efficiency.168
Expanding the analysis in this manner highlights the complex
interactions among these factors.  Interestingly, the policy implications
do not all point in the same direction.  Specifically, the differentiated
products approach indicates that the best way to render a market
more competitive is by strengthening the first and third aspects of cop-
yright protection (i.e., increasing the number of welfare-generating
activities encompassed by the right and the authors’ ability to appro-
priate surplus), while weakening it along the second dimension (i.e.,
narrowing copyright breadth).  In other words, markets for copy-
righted works would be most competitive if the right were large (in
that it encompassed a wide sweep of surplus-generating activity within
its scope) and intense (in that authors were able to appropriate a high
proportion of the surplus determined by the first criterion to be within
the right), but narrow (in that new works could exhibit a high degree
of similarity without constituting infringement).  The differentiated
products approach is therefore not an unqualified endorsement for
strengthening copyright protection.  Instead, by providing a basis for
distinguishing among different aspects of copyright protection, it
allows for a more nuanced approach to copyright policy.
165 See, e.g., Klemperer, supra note 28, at 114.  For a more complete enumeration of the R
various conceptions of patent breadth, see Denicolò, supra note 35, at 251–53. R
166 See, e.g., Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 35 (examining infinite-term patents); R
Klemperer, supra note 28, at 120–21 (describing conditions under which long, narrow R
patent is most efficient); Tandon, supra note 35 (advocating infinite life for patents, subject R
to compulsory licensing).
167 See, e.g., Gallini, supra note 35 (arguing for broad patents, with length determined R
accordingly); Klemperer, supra note 28, at 121–23 (describing conditions under which R
short, broad patent is most efficient).
168 See Koenker & Perry, supra note 140, at 226–27 (describing relationships among R
fixed costs, substitutability, and appropriability); Spence, Product Selection, supra note 77, R
at 230–31, 234 (same); Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at 410, 413 (same). R
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A. Determinants of the Differentiated Products Equilibrium
1. The Size of the Relevant Market Relative to the Fixed Cost of
Entry
The most important determinant of the overall competitiveness
of markets for copyrighted works is the magnitude of the relevant
market relative to the fixed costs of entry.  As noted earlier, this ratio
determines the number of works that will exist in equilibrium.169  As
such, it has a direct impact on the extent to which entry will amelio-
rate deadweight loss.  If the relevant market segment is small relative
to the fixed costs of entry, the number of works in the market will be
relatively small, competition will be thin, and the spread between
price and marginal cost will be relatively large.  If the relevant market
is large relative to fixed costs, the number of works will be relatively
large, competition will be robust, and the spread between price and
marginal cost will be relatively narrow.
Since copyright policy has relatively little impact on the absolute
size of the fixed costs needed to produce the first copy of a creative
work, the primary means for policymakers to increase this ratio is to
expand the number of surplus-generating activities that fall within the
scope of each copyrighted work.  Several specific policy tools are
available to change the “size” of copyright.  One determinant of the
size of the right that has received a great deal of attention in recent
months is the length of the copyright term.170  But other examples
abound, such as the extent to which copyright allows authors to earn
royalties for performances of their works.
The differentiated products approach suggests that increasing the
number of surplus-generating activities contained within the scope of
each copyrighted work can promote both access and incentives by
increasing the equilibrium number of works.  The suggestion that
access would be promoted best by raising rather than lowering the
level of copyright protection may seem counterintuitive.  After all, it
implies that the proper policy response to markets that are too con-
centrated is to increase the degree of copyright protection that
authors enjoy.  This apparent contradiction disappears when viewed in
light of the traditional approach’s inability to capture the dynamics of
entry.  So long as entry is free, any strengthening in the level of copy-
169 See supra notes 88–90, 102 and accompanying text. R
170 In 1998, Congress extended the term of copyright protection to the life of the author
plus seventy years. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102(b) & (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827–28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000)).
This legislation recently withstood a constitutional challenge in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003).
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right protection will not ultimately accrue to the benefit of the incum-
bents.  Instead, it will only attract more entry, which will in turn
reduce deadweight loss and bring the number of works closer to the
optimum.  Any short-term profits made possible by the expansion of
the size of the right will eventually accrue back to consumers in the
form of increased product variety.
2. The Appropriability of Surplus
Another consideration that determines the market’s ability to
promote economic welfare is the intensity of authors’ rights, as mea-
sured by their ability to appropriate the surplus created by their
works.  As noted earlier, any slippage in appropriability tends to
reduce the equilibrium number of works.171  Such a reduction can
harm the incentives side of the tradeoff by causing the total number of
works produced to drop below optimal levels.  It also harms the access
side of the tradeoff by limiting the extent to which entry by new works
will flatten authors’ demand curves and thereby reduce deadweight
loss.
This suggests that increasing authors’ ability to capture the sur-
plus created by their works will tend to enhance welfare.  Again, this
argument may seem counterintuitive from the standpoint of the tradi-
tional approach to copyright.  The solution lies in understanding that
access may be promoted as much by increasing the number of works
available for consumption as by mandating access to the limited
number of works that already have been created.  The power of this
insight easily can be discerned when the differentiated products
approach is used to analyze two of the most salient issues in copyright
law:  fair use and price discrimination.
(a) Fair Use
The fair use doctrine provides authors who incorporate limited
portions of a copyrighted work into their own creative works with an
affirmative defense against copyright liability.  In determining
whether a particular use of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use, the
governing statute directs courts to consider four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substitutability of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
171 See supra Part IV.B.1.
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the
copyrighted work.172
Copyright scholars have offered two distinct economic justifica-
tions for fair use.  Some have regarded fair use as one way that the law
tips copyright towards the access side of the access-incentives tradeoff
by ensuring that the total surplus appropriated by the copyright
holder is not excessive.173  The other economic justification regards
fair use as a means of compensating for market failures induced by
transaction costs.174  In the tradition of Calabresi and Melamed,175 this
perspective posits that the government should mandate access to a
work whenever friction in the bargaining process prevents a welfare-
enhancing transaction from occurring.176
Technological innovations such as digital rights management and
the Internet have sharpened the conflict between these two theories
and have touched off a debate over whether the reduction in transac-
tion costs made possible by these developments should have any
impact on the fair use doctrine’s scope.177  If fair use is intended to
redress market failures caused by transaction costs, these technolog-
ical developments should cause the fair use doctrine to contract.  Any
such narrowing of fair use would alarm those theorists who view the
doctrine as a way to limit monopoly power.178  Quite the contrary,
172 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
173 See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14.2.3.a, at 1:51–1:54 (2d ed. 1996 &
Supp. 2004); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110,
1135–36 (1990); Sterk, supra note 10, at 1211–12. R
174 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627–30
(1982); Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 357–58. R
175 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
176 Transaction cost theories of property can be seen as part of the larger debate about
the optimal size and degree of standardization in property rights. See, e.g., Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:  The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002) (analyzing
property rights regimes in light of conclusion that purpose of limitations on types of prop-
erty rights is to facilitate verification of ownership); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999) (arguing that increasing fragmentation of
property rights undermines usefulness of private property as economic institution and con-
stitutional category); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (contrasting in rem conception of property
with conception of property as bundle of in personam rights).
177 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 224 (1994); Bell, supra note 57, R
at 579–600; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217, 239–42; Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880
(1999); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?  Property Rights and Contract in the
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–35 (1997).
178 Any contraction of fair use also would be a source of considerable concern to those
who view the doctrine as a means to promote other, noneconomic goals. See, e.g., Fisher,
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because the reduction in transaction costs allows authors to appro-
priate a larger amount of the available surplus, these technologies
arguably would support a concomitant weakening in the strength of
copyright protection by expanding the number of activities that consti-
tute fair use.
The differentiated products approach offers a structural basis for
the fair use doctrine capable of resolving the conflict between these
two opposing points of view.  In emphasizing the importance of maxi-
mizing authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, the differentiated prod-
ucts approach supports keeping fair use as narrow as possible.
Somewhat counterintuitively, it suggests that fair use should be
broadest when competition is the most intense and narrowest when
markets are the most highly concentrated and the chance of
supracompetitive profits the greatest.
Consonant with the transaction cost approach, it would sanction a
fair use doctrine designed to facilitate welfare-enhancing uses of copy-
righted works that otherwise would be barred by frictional considera-
tions.  Indeed, the transaction cost approach does not itself provide a
theory by which the optimal price, quantity, and mix of creative works
can be determined.  Instead, it implicitly presupposes the existence of
an efficient outcome and simply examines when frictional considera-
tions prevent markets from achieving it.  By providing a basis for
determining a baseline efficient outcome, the differentiated products
approach can be regarded as a complementary analysis that provides
the type of external foundation that the transaction cost approach
needs, but cannot provide itself.
The differentiated products approach also accepts the fact that
the scope of the fair use doctrine ought to narrow as technology
causes transaction costs to decrease.179  It also dismisses as fundamen-
tally misplaced the concerns that doing so will upset the balance
between access and incentives by putting too much weight on the
supra note 3, at 1744–94 (arguing that fair use should be designed to promote just social R
order); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/
Spring 2003, at 463, 478–82 (defending fair use as means for protecting individual creative
expression); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair:  A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1150–61 (1990) (advocating vision of doctrine based on normative
conception of fairness).
179 It remains possible that transaction costs might nonetheless remain high for uses
such as parody and criticism, which necessarily require access to a specific work.  In that
case, the follow-on author would be locked into a bilateral monopoly with the original
author in which no real substitutes would be available.  Any fair use doctrine justified in
this manner would necessarily be limited in scope to parody, criticism, and other forms of
derivative use that raise these types of concerns. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making
Fun of Me?:  Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J.
305 (1993).
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latter.  Although constricting the scope of the fair use doctrine will
increase authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, entry by substitute
products simultaneously should increase access and dissipate any
excess investment incentives.
(b) Price Discrimination
Another salient issue in current copyright scholarship is the
extent to which copyright law should facilitate price discrimination.180
It could do so by relaxing the first sale doctrine181 or by encouraging
digital rights management182 and a host of other devices designed to
permit increasingly fine degrees of customer segmentation.
As noted earlier, the traditional approach focuses primarily on
whether price discrimination will reduce deadweight loss by increasing
output of works that already have been created, as well as on the dis-
tributional implications of authors’ enhanced ability to earn profits.183
It should be noted from the outset that far from being an iniquitous
business device, price discrimination is more properly regarded as an
inevitable consequence of the fact that consumption of copyrighted
works is often nonrival.  For rival goods, the central problem is how to
allocate output to individual customers.  When goods are nonrival,
however, allocation of output is unproblematic.  Once the first copy
has been created, the author can create an endless stream of copies
without incurring any additional costs.  Instead, the central economic
problem for nonrival goods becomes allocating the first-copy costs
rather than output.184  The classic pricing schemes for the efficient
180 See supra notes 56–57, 60 and accompanying text. R
181 The first sale doctrine recognizes that copyright holders’ right to control the terms
under which their works can be transferred only applies to the first sale of the work.  Once
a person has purchased a copyrighted work, that person remains free to resell it at any
price he or she sees fit. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza
Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140–42 (1998).  Because low-price customers remain free
to resell their copies to those customers that the author would like to charge higher prices,
the first sale doctrine sharply limits copyright holders’ ability to engage in price
discrimination.
182 Digital rights management (DRM) is the use of software and other technological
devices to control access to creative works.  By preventing resale to third parties and by
increasing authors’ ability to meter the intensity of usage, DRM substantially enhances the
ability to engage in price discrimination. See Bell, supra note 57, at 588 n.142; Cohen, R
supra note 7, at 1121; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: R
A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 62–63, 85–86 (1997); R. Anthony
Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of
Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 659 (2003).
183 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. R
184 See SHARKEY, supra note 69, at 46. R
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allocation of fixed costs all depend upon the producer’s ability to
charge different prices to different customers.185
The differentiated products approach reveals that the problems
associated with deadweight loss also can be ameliorated by stimu-
lating entry by new works, which in turn relies on competition to
reduce the spread between price and marginal cost.  In this manner,
facilitating price discrimination and its accompanying increase in
appropriability of the available surplus can cause welfare to increase
regardless of whether the production of any particular work increases
or decreases.  The differentiated products approach also reveals that
price discrimination is unlikely to give rise to sustainable supracompe-
titive profits.  Any such profits should be dissipated by new entry,
which inures to the benefit of consumers by allowing them to consume
works that lie closer to their ideal preferences.
By underscoring the crucial role that the appropriability of sur-
plus plays in maximizing total welfare, the differentiated products
approach provides a strong justification for supporting authors’ ability
to engage in price discrimination.  Somewhat counterintutively, the
case for doing so is the strongest when the markets are the most con-
centrated and the fewest substitutes exist, since it is under those cir-
cumstances that inducing entry by new works is the most critical.
3. The Degree of Substitutability
Finally, the total return captured by any particular work turns on
the extent to which consumers regard competing works as substitutes.
As noted earlier, works that serve as relatively good substitutes for
other works will capture a larger amount of the surplus available in
the adjacent areas.  The degree of substitutability depends upon the
structure of demand, as reflected in the cross-price elasticities.  As a
result, competition will be most robust when substitutability is the
highest.
The degree of substitutability plays a natural role in determining
how many firms will enter at equilibrium and how robust the competi-
tion among those firms will be.  The “breadth” of copyright, or the
185 One of the classic solutions to the pricing of nonrival goods is known as Lindahl
pricing, in which different consumers are charged different prices (and thus bear a different
proportion of the fixed costs) based on their marginal valuations of the total quantity. See
Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE 168 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds.,
1958).  Lindahl pricing bears some similarities to a pricing scheme popular in the regulated
industries literature known as Ramsey pricing, in which fixed costs are allocated among
buyers based on the elasticity of their demand, with those buyers with the least elastic
demand bearing the heaviest burden. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of
Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58–59 (1927).
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scope of infringement, is a legal constraint on substitution because
infringing works cannot compete absent permission from the copy-
right holder.  This analysis thus initially suggests that copyright should
be kept as narrow as possible so as not to add any exogenous con-
straints that would prevent the market from becoming as competitive
as possible.
There is, however, one consideration that cuts the other way.
Substitutability also determines the extent to which the surplus cap-
tured by any particular work derives from demand diversion.  The
higher the degree of substitutability between the works, the greater
the proportion of the total surplus captured that demand diversion
will represent.  As noted earlier, demand diversion plays a critical role
in determining how closely the total number of works produced will
approximate the optimum.186  Up to a point, demand diversion is ben-
eficial, as it can replace the surplus that authors are unable to appro-
priate because of their imperfect ability to price discriminate.  Beyond
that point, demand diversion creates the possibility of excess entry.
Thus, the danger of excess entry is greatest when goods are the most
substitutable.
As discussed earlier, policymakers may reduce the impact of
demand diversion by using the standard of copyright infringement to
increase the distance between adjacent works.  Doing so would
require a delicate balance.  Widening the breadth of copyright protec-
tion would tend to force the number of works below equilibrium
levels.  This decrease in the number of works would in turn harm the
access side of the tradeoff by causing deadweight loss to increase.  At
the same time, increasing copyright breadth might simultaneously
offer compensating benefits on the incentives side of the tradeoff,
since increasing copyright breadth would potentially bring the total
number of works closer to optimal levels.  When demand diversion is
most likely to cause excessive entry (i.e., when substitutability among
works is the highest), policymakers may have to strike a difficult
balance.
B. Interactions Among the Different Aspects of
Copyright Protection
The differentiated products approach thus provides a framework
that is able to distinguish among three different types of policy instru-
ments.  Although this degree of nuance enriches the power of the
analysis, it also makes copyright policy considerably more difficult to
implement.  Indeed, two of the leading differentiated products theo-
186 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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rists candidly have conceded that “we believe that we would be quite
unable to recognize an optimum if we saw one.”187
One problem is that the available policy tools are not completely
independent.  As noted earlier, one of the key determinants of
optimal entry is appropriability.  This suggests that the market will
exhibit a bias against works that are able to appropriate only a rela-
tively small proportion of the surplus they create.  Product differentia-
tion theory suggests that a work’s ability to appropriate surplus is
determined in no small part by the shape of its demand function.  Spe-
cifically, the market will be biased against works whose demand
curves are convex to the origin, such as the one represented in the
left-hand graph in Figure 7.188  It will be biased in favor of works
whose demand curves are concave to the origin, such as the one repre-
sented in the right-hand graph.










Whether a demand curve is convex or concave to the origin
depends on the steepness of the relevant inverse demand function.189
Works with steep inverse demand functions tend to be products with
low own-price elasticities of demand.  The market thus will be espe-
cially biased against works that have the fewest substitutes, as it is
187 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 760. R
188 Figure 7 is adapted from Yoo, supra note 2, at 1613 fig.8.  For similar representations, R
see BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 70 figs.4.7–4.8; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra R
note 16, at 112 figs.4.5–4.6; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at 409 fig.1. R
189 See Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 77, at 409–10; Spence & Owen, R
supra note 140, at 111–12. See generally Yoo, supra note 2, at 1612–13 (reviewing this R
literature).
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these works that capture the lowest proportion of the available sur-
plus.  This implies that the case for increasing copyright protection
and strengthening authors’ ability to capture surplus is the strongest
when the market is the most concentrated.
Derivative works provide another example of where two factors
interact.190  On the one hand, authorization of a derivative work
expands the first factor by increasing the number of surplus-
generating activities captured by the author.  On the other hand, it
also increases the number of substitutes with which the licensed work
must compete.  In other words, the decision to license simultaneously
makes the triangle taller and narrower.191
The overlapping nature of these considerations further compli-
cates isolating the impact of any particular aspect of copyright
policy.192  It nevertheless may be possible to simplify the analysis with
respect to particular industries or categories of copyrighted works.  If
one aspect of copyright protection can be taken as fixed with respect
to certain types of works, the problem that must be solved becomes
much simpler.
Empirical studies may provide additional insights into the bal-
ance of these problems.  For example, ruling out as an empirical
matter the dangers of excess entry induced by demand diversion
would simplify the analysis considerably, as it would allow policy-
makers to focus on ensuring that copyright be as large, intense, and
narrow as possible.  Some initial illustrative calculations suggest that
so long as the relevant economy is relatively large, any welfare losses
resulting from excessive entry are likely to be quite small.193
The empirical evidence on the magnitude of these welfare losses,
however, is somewhat equivocal.  A study of entry patterns in the
radio industry conducted by Steven Berry and Joel Waldfogel esti-
mates that the deadweight losses attributable to excess entry may be
substantial.194  They acknowledge, however, that the radio industry is
somewhat unusual in that it serves two different groups of cus-
190 As noted earlier, this Article captures only part of the debate surrounding derivative
use as it sets to one side the impact of cumulative innovation and analyzes each work as an
independent creation. See supra note 4.  For my preliminary observations on cumulative R
innovation, see infra note 204. R
191 I thank Louis Kaplow for providing me with this insight.
192 See T. Brennan, Right to Deny, supra note 3, at 705 n.101. R
193 See G.K. Yarrow, Welfare Losses in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition, 33 J.
INDUS. ECON. 515, 520 (1985) (estimating welfare losses for large economies at 0.5% of
total revenue).  A very different result obtains in the case of small economies. See id. at
523 (concluding that welfare losses will be several times larger if market segment is oligo-
polistic); see also BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 26, at 64–66 (reaching similar R
conclusion).
194 Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 134, at 411–12. R
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tomers—advertisers and listeners—only one of which (advertisers) is
able to make direct payments for programming.  What appears to be
excessive entry when measured solely in terms of benefits to adver-
tisers may in fact be efficient when measured in terms of both adver-
tisers and listeners.195  In addition, the fact that their study assumed
that the radio market is composed of homogeneous products196 led
them to overlook potential welfare benefits resulting from product
differentiation.  The existing theoretical literature suggests that this
simplifying assumption can have a fairly dramatic effect on the wel-
fare implications.197
Another empirical study, by Ronald Goettler and Ron Shachar
on spatial competition among the three major television networks,
reached a somewhat different conclusion.  They concluded that the
networks’ program offerings nearly fully achieved the optimum sug-
gested by the underlying Nash equilibrium.198  The shortfall was
largely (but not completely) explained by the networks’ adherence to
the rules of thumb against airing sitcoms after 10:00 p.m. and against
airing news magazines before 10:00 p.m.199  Goettler and Shachar
attribute the remainder of the shortfall to bounded rationality and the
difficulty in identifying competing products when they have several
attributes.200
These studies suggest the possibility of isolating the impact of
each of the three factors discussed in this Part (i.e., the size of the
195 Id. at 412–14.  Some indirect data from Europe raise doubts as to whether this is
plausible.  Id.
196 Id. at 398–99.  They offer a preliminary discussion of how taking product differentia-
tion into account might change the analysis, concluding that product heterogeneity
explains part of the proliferation of stations, but that demand diversion continues to play a
role.  Unfortunately, the current state of the literature does not permit them to estimate
the magnitude of the welfare loss or to determine how much of it was attributable to
demand diversion. Id. at 414–17.
197 The differences between homogenous and differentiated products are illustrated by
Mankiw and Whinston’s landmark analysis of demand diversion.  They first consider a
homogeneous product market in which entry creates a net reduction in demand for each
incumbent (i.e., demand diversion dominates demand creation).  When the integer
problem is ignored, markets unambiguously tend to produce excess diversity.  Mankiw &
Whinston, supra note 90, at 51–52.  Taking the integer problem into account creates the R
possibility of insufficient entry by no more than one firm, although the welfare losses from
this shortfall may be substantial. Id. at 53.  When products are differentiated, however,
markets may create either excess or insufficient entry. Id. at 54–55.  It is worth noting that
all of these analyses assume that entry causes the output per firm to fall. Id. at 51 (assump-
tion 2).  It is theoretically possible that demand creation could so dominate demand diver-
sion that entry might instead cause output per firm to rise. Id. at 52 n.7.
198 Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Television
Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624, 647–48 (2001).
199 Id. at 649–51.
200 Id. at 651–52.
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right, the appropriability of surplus, and substitutability).  Even if the
empirical problem proves intractable, the differentiated products
approach still should provide useful intuitions about the way these
factors interact.201  It suggests, for example, that excess entry is least
likely to be a problem when a work has few substitutes.  Thus, con-
trary to the conventional wisdom, it is when a work is the most unique
that the case for strengthening the level of copyright protection in
terms of the size of the right and appropriability is the strongest.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, product differentiation offers significant
promise as a way to reconceptualize the economic analysis of copy-
right law.  Not only does it offer a better theoretical explanation for a
number of market features, it also provides a basis for formalizing
both the access and incentives sides of the tradeoff in a way that yields
insights into their structural interrelationship.
What emerges is an approach that demonstrates how stimulating
entry can promote both access and incentives simultaneously.  This
stands in stark contrast to the position that dominates existing copy-
right scholarship, which views these two considerations as being in
inexorable tension.
The differentiated products approach also suggests that the best
policy response to a highly concentrated market might well be to
strengthen the degree of copyright protection in ways that tend to
stimulate new entry.  The ensuing competition should dissipate
supracompetitive returns and ensure that authors capture only enough
revenue to cover their costs of production.  Such a task is more conso-
nant with the conventional understanding of government’s institu-
tional capabilities than is the task envisioned by the traditional
approach.
It may seem counterintuitive that copyright protection should be
the greatest when high fixed costs and low substitutability cause the
market to become the most concentrated, but this apparent paradox is
resolved once one understands the complex manner in which access
and incentives interact with one another.  In this sense, the differenti-
ated products approach to copyright captures some of the insights of
classic property theory, which emphasizes the importance of well-
defined property rights in ensuring optimal investment and deploy-
ment.  In so doing, it corrects for the blind spot that results when mar-
kets for copyrighted works are treated as monopolies and allows for
201 Samuelson, supra note 92, at 108 n.5 (defending Chamberlin against similar criti- R
cism); see also CHAMBERLIN, supra note 92, at 304–05 (same). R
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-1\NYU104.txt unknown Seq: 66 26-MAR-04 15:32
April 2004] COPYRIGHT AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 277
serious consideration of the role of short-run profits in stimulating
entry and promoting economic efficiency.  At the same time, it moves
beyond classic property theory by identifying ways in which a prop-
erty right can be too strong.
It bears noting that the differentiated products approach cannot
completely resolve the tension between access and incentives.  The
presence of a downward-sloping demand curve renders some degree
of deadweight loss endemic.  In addition, the fact that perfect price
discrimination is impossible prevents authors from appropriating all of
the surplus created by their works.  As a result, markets may exhibit a
systematic tendency towards having too little diversity.  However,
demand diversion makes it possible that the market will produce the
optimal number of works.  Any such solution to the incentives side of
the tradeoff necessarily requires accepting a degree of inefficiency in
terms of access.  As the theory of the comparative second-best aptly
points out, the differentiated products approach’s inability to generate
first-best outcomes is not by itself sufficient to justify rejecting it.  At
least with respect to some market segments, in which the fixed costs of
entry are small relative to the overall size of the market segment, the
well-documented flaws associated with governmental calibration of
the level of copyright protection202 make it quite plausible that the
differentiated products approach may offer the more attractive policy
alternative.  At the same time, demand diversion raises the possibility
that the equilibrium level of entry may be inefficiently excessive.
In addition, the differentiated products approach allows for a
more nuanced analysis by making it possible for policymakers to dis-
tinguish among different aspects of copyright protection.  This repre-
sents a substantial improvement over the traditional approach, which
tends to represent all aspects of the strength of copyright protection
with a single variable and fails to distinguish among copyright’s dif-
ferent aspects.  In so doing, it suggests that efficiency best might be
served by making the right large (in terms of surplus-generating activi-
ties within its scope) and intense (in terms of the proportion of that
surplus that authors are able to appropriate), but narrow (in terms of
how close another work can come to an existing work without
infringing the copyright).  Thus, the differentiated products approach
does not amount to a blanket endorsement for strengthening copy-
right protection.  On the contrary, the resulting theory allows for a
degree of subtlety that is impossible under other approaches.
Although my analysis has clear theoretical implications, consider-
able additional work remains to be done before it can be fully opera-
202 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. R
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tionalized.  As noted earlier, further work should incorporate
elements of cumulative innovation that take into account the extent to
which current works serve as inputs to subsequent works,203 although,
for reasons I set forth in the margin, I suspect that such considerations
ultimately will not prove problematic.204  Furthermore, the differenti-
ated products approach should be broadened to account for endoge-
nous pricing as well as the preemptive strategies available when entry
is sequential and when firms can occupy more than one location.205
Perhaps most importantly, the models should consider the impli-
cations of relaxing the symmetrical preferences assumption, either by
allowing for variations in the distribution of consumers across the
characteristics space or by allowing the extent to which particular
203 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  The literature on sequential innovation in R
the context of patents is more extensive. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Anti-
trust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995); Jerry R. Green &
Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON.
20 (1995); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection
for Cumulative Systems Technologies, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674 (1994); Ted O’Donoghue, A
Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, 29 RAND J. ECON. 654 (1998);
Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators:  Should Second-Generation Products Be
Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1996); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders
of Giants:  Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991); Michael
Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 860 (1990).
204 Just as stimulating entry of close substitutes should promote access by readers
through using increased competition to lower price, it should also promote access by
follow-on authors who seek to build on prior work.  Once the market for the work
becomes sufficiently competitive, the problem of cumulative innovation—in which a copy-
righted work is licensed simultaneously to both consumers and other authors who seek to
use the work as an input in creating other works—becomes analogous to the classic
problem of transfer pricing, in which a particular good simultaneously serves as an end
product and as an input for another product.  The transfer pricing literature indicates that
welfare is maximized when the price of the good as an input is set equal to the price of the
good as a final product, so long as the final product market is sufficiently competitive. See
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
79–83 (1992).
Thus, so long as the total surplus in the market is sufficiently large relative to the fixed
costs of entry, there is nothing inefficient about charging the market price to follow-on
authors who seek access to a copyrighted work as an input in creating other works.  Should
the market for the works not be sufficiently competitive, the differentiated products
approach suggests that the problem might be redressed by stimulating entry to make the
market more competitive rather than by lowering the price paid by follow-on authors.
It is true that holdout behavior may lead particular authors to refuse to license their
works.  Competition policy, however, focuses on protecting competition, not particular
competitors.  Thus, unless such refusals create losses for more than just particular individ-
uals, no intervention is warranted.  The most compelling cases for protecting follow-on
innovation are presented by parody and criticism, which necessarily require access to a
specific work.  As noted earlier, any intervention undertaken to remedy this problem
would be designed solely for the benefit of parodists and would not take the form of a
general revision of the scope of copyright protection. See supra note 179. R
205 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. R
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works serve as substitutes for other works to vary.206  Relaxing the
symmetry assumption allows for the possibility that the impact of
entry by a new work will no longer be spread evenly across all of the
incumbents.  Instead, it suggests that the entry will affect only some of
the works.  This localization of competition has the effect of dividing
the relevant market into subsegments, with the overall competitive-
ness of each subsegment determined by the size of the total surplus of
the subsegment relative to the fixed cost.  The lack of robust competi-
tion within a subsegment may limit the extent to which entry can push
price towards marginal cost.  It can also allow the “integer problem”
to arise simultaneously with respect to multiple portions of the overall
market, as the single “large economy” is chopped into a series of
“small economies” that each are capable of supporting sustainable
profits.207  If these effects arise with respect to multiple subsegments,
the combined adverse impact may be quite substantial,208 although the
resulting policy prescription may be the same as when consumer pref-
erences are assumed to be symmetric.209
Countervailing considerations exist as well.  The discussion of
spatial competition assumes that product characteristics vary along a
single dimension, in which case works compete exclusively with their
two adjacent neighbors.  The localized nature of differentiated prod-
ucts competition can be substantially mitigated if spatial competition
206 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. R
207 Interestingly, the market need not be divided into discrete subsegments in order for
this effect to occur.  Variations in the density of firms across the product space can bal-
kanize the industry into a chain of “overlapping oligopolies,” each comprised of a small
number of firms engaged in localized competition regardless of how many firms are oper-
ating in the overall market.  This can give rise to the same problems even in the absence of
actual gaps in the product continuum. See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 750, 763–64; R
Nicholas Kaldor, Mrs. Robinson’s “Economics of Imperfect Competition,” 1 ECONOMICA
335, 339–40 (1934).  This result provides an answer to the criticism that Chamberlinian
product groups are nothing more than Marshallian industries. See MILTON FRIEDMAN,
The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 38–39
(1953) (offering this criticism); GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retro-
spect, in FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 12, 17 (1949) (same), reprinted in
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 309, 314 (1968).  It suggests that
products that do not compete directly with one another may nonetheless be linked
together through a chain of competitive products.
208 See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 26, at 750. R
209 By underscoring the role that fixed costs and substitutability among works plays in
the analysis, preference asymmetries simply may reinforce the same conclusions discussed
above.  In other words, to the extent that preference asymmetries cause competition within
the subsegment to be insufficiently robust, the solution may be to thicken the market by
increasing the size and the intensity of copyright protection.
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occurs along more than one dimension.210  Empirical studies have
confirmed these insights.211
Finally, the policy instruments that follow from the differentiated
products approach are by their nature extremely contextual and do
not lend themselves to simple application.  In addition, the interrela-
tionships among the available policy instruments make calibrating
them simultaneously an extremely difficult empirical exercise.212  The
fact that the differentiated products approach is contextual and
nuanced should not obscure its basic analytical power.213  Indeed, the
intuitions that the theory reveals about the relationship between
access and efficiency, the manner in which the various aspects of copy-
right protection interrelate, and the true relationship between copy-
right and public goods theory are sufficient to justify further inquiry.
210 One theoretical analysis concluded that if spatial competition takes place on three
dimensions, each work may compete with as many as six adjacent neighbors.  If competi-
tion expands to four dimensions, works may theoretically compete with as many as half the
works operating in the product group. See Archibald & Rosenbluth, supra note 111, at R
576–84.
211 See Feenstra & Levinsohn, supra note 111, at 36–41 (modeling competition among R
automobiles sold in 1987 model year as taking place along four product dimensions—
weight, horsepower, reliability, and whether car was European—and finding that, on
average, cars competed with 5.90 other models).
212 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. R
213 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. R
